

DEV

INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
University of East Anglia

# Reports and Policy Papers

## Protected area governance, carbon offset forestry, and environmental (in)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda

Connor Joseph Cavanagh

2015

UEA

University of East Anglia

International Development UEA & School of International Development,  
University of East Anglia , Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom

## DEV Reports and Policy Papers

### Protected area governance, carbon offset forestry, and environmental (in)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda

Connor Joseph Cavanagh

---

First published by the School of International Development in January, 2015.

This publication may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for resale. The papers should be cited with due acknowledgment.

This publication may be cited as:

Cavanagh, C. J., 2015, Protected area governance, carbon offset forestry, and environmental (in)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda, DEV Reports and Policy Paper Series, The School of International Development, University of East Anglia, UK.

#### **About the Authors**

Connor Joseph Cavanagh is PhD Research Fellow in the Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric) of the Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Contact:

Email: [connor.cavanagh@nmbu.com](mailto:connor.cavanagh@nmbu.com)

Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric)

Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU)

P.O. Box 5003

NO-1432 Ås

Norway

Tel: +47 (0) 48302046

ISSN 1756-7904

### **About the DEV Reports and Policy Papers**

These are reports and policy papers that reproduce consultancy, applied research findings and policy work conducted by the School of International Development or International Development UEA (formerly Overseas Development Group). Launched in 2007, they provide an opportunity for staff, associated researchers and fellows to disseminate studies and findings on a wide range of subjects. Recent past work, provided it meets the standards required and has contemporary significance is also welcome.

### **About the School of International Development**

The School of International Development (DEV) applies economic, social and natural science disciplines to the study of international development, with special emphasis on social and environmental change and poverty alleviation. DEV has a strong commitment to an interdisciplinary research and teaching approach to Development Studies and the study of poverty. This has been developed over a forty year period, bringing together researchers and students from different disciplines (economists, social scientists, natural resource scientists) into research areas and teaching teams.

### **The International Development UEA (formerly Overseas Development Group)**

Founded in 1967, International Development UEA is a charitable company wholly owned by the University of East Anglia, which handles the consultancy, research, and training undertaken by the faculty members in DEV and approximately 200 external consultants. Since its foundation it has provided training for professionals from more than 70 countries and completed over 1,000 consultancy and research assignments. International Development UEA provides DEV staff with opportunities to participate in on-going development work, practical and policy related engagement which add a unique and valuable element to the School's teaching programmes.

### **For further information on DEV and the International Development UEA, please contact:**

School of International Development  
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom  
Tel: +44 (0)1603 592329  
Fax: +44 (0)1603 451999  
Email: [dev.general@uea.ac.uk](mailto:dev.general@uea.ac.uk)  
Web: [www.uea.ac.uk/dev](http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev)

# Protected area governance, carbon offset forestry, and environmental (in)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda

Connor Joseph Cavanagh

PhD Research Fellow

Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric)

Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU)

P.O. Box 5003

NO-1432 Ås

Norway

[connor.cavanagh@nmbu.com](mailto:connor.cavanagh@nmbu.com), +47 48302046

## Abstract

At Mount Elgon National Park in Uganda, local conservation authorities assert that a variety of benefit sharing schemes mitigate the negative consequences of exclusionary forest conservation and carbon sequestration for nearby communities. Among other initiatives, these include the redistribution of ecotourism revenue, the signing of collaborative resource management agreements, and the provision of ecotourism-related employment opportunities. Conservationists argue that these schemes result in ‘triple-win’ outcomes for both the national park and local communities, wherein biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation, and development goals mutually complement each other. Taking an environmental justice approach, this report synthesizes findings concerning local notions of (in)justice, actual geographical and temporal distributions of benefits from conservation at Mount Elgon, and the effects of such distributions on perceptions and mobilizations related to environmental justice. In doing so, it identifies widespread expressions of resentment and hostility among local communities, as well as large inequalities in access to ecotourism revenue and other benefits both between and within them. To highlight a salient example, worst-off park neighbours received assistance equivalent to only 0.0085 USD per district resident over a nine-year period. The perceived injustices that arise from these inequalities exacerbate conflicts between conservationists and local people, and, consequently, result in ecological damage to protected forests. To alleviate both the environmental injustice and degradation entailed by these inequalities, the report concludes with a number of recommendations for universalizing sustainable access to collaboratively managed resources on Mount Elgon.

**Keywords:** Conservation; benefit sharing; legitimacy; environmental justice; inequality; Mount Elgon; Uganda

# Table of Contents

List of Acronyms .....	iii
<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2. Study Area, Background, and Methodology.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.1 Mount Elgon National Park (MENP), Uganda .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.2. Brief Management History.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2.3 Uganda Wildlife Authority-Forest Absorbing Carbon Emissions (UWA-FACE) Project... 8</b>	
<b>2.4 Sampling and Data Collection .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3.0 Results .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3.1 Local Notions of Environmental (In)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda (RQ1).....</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1.1 Uganda Wildlife Authority and Related Government Agencies .....	12
3.1.2 Park-Adjacent Communities at Mount Elgon.....	17
<b>3.2 Effects of Park-Community Conflicts on Access to Land and Natural Resources (RQ2).. 24</b>	
3.2.1 Mount Elgon: Ecotourism in Context.....	25
3.2.2 Divide and Rule? The Political Ecology of Revenue Sharing .....	28
3.2.3 Enforcing Scarcity: Environmental (In)justice and the Uneven Geographical Distribution of Resource Access Agreements.....	33
3.2.4 Summary: ‘Vicious’ and ‘Virtuous’ Cycles of Community-Park Interaction .....	35
<b>3.3 Effects of Higher-Level mobilizations on Claims of (In)justice and Access to Natural Resources (RQ3).....</b>	<b>37</b>
3.3.1 Higher Level Mobilizations, the Benet Resettlement Process, and the Politics of Indigeneity .....	38
3.3.2 Higher Level Mobilizations and the UWA-FACE Project.....	41
<b>4.0 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>47</b>

## List of Acronyms

BCU	Bugisu Cooperative Union
BSA	Benefit-Sharing Arrangement
CBC	Community Based Conservation
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPR	Common-Pool Resource
CRMA	Collaborative Resource Management Agreement
FACE	Forest Absorbing Carbon Emissions Foundation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FPCF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FPIC	Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoU	Government of Uganda
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
LC	Local Council
LDC	Least Developed Country
LVBC	Lake Victoria Basin Commission
MECDP	Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project
MENP	Mount Elgon National Park
MERECPP	Mount Elgon Regional Ecosystem Conservation Programme
NAPE	National Action Plan for the Environment
NEMA	National Environmental Management Authority (Uganda)
NFA	National Forestry Authority (Uganda)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PA	Protected Area
PAPIA	Protected Areas and Poverty in Africa Project
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RS	Revenue Sharing
SES	Socio-Ecological System
SGS	Société Général de Surveillance
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
TBNRM	Transboundary Natural Resource Management
TBPAM	Transboundary Protected Area Management
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNP	Uganda National Parks

UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VCM	Voluntary Carbon Market
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WCMC	World Conservation Monitoring Centre

## 1. Introduction

In East Africa, conservationists have long sought to downplay the detrimental impacts of exclusionary protected areas by emphasizing the ways in which a variety of benefits accrue to adjacent communities. Initially, when colonial governments utilized the “legal fiction” of *terra nullius* (Adams 2003, 20) or waste-land (Webster and Osmaston, 2003, 125) to expropriate forest ecosystems, these resources were ostensibly held “in trust” for native populations, thus precluding direct compensation for lost access to land and resources. Yet, even under colonialism, benefits from conservation were said to include employment opportunities, limited resource access, and protection from environmental degradation, albeit accruing to local populations as “privileges” rather than “rights” (e.g. Webster 1954, p. 6). In the first instance, however, it must be said that numerous communities throughout East Africa both contest the legitimacy of this initial alienation of land and resources, and continue to press customary claims to territories that were initially designated as protected areas under colonial rule (e.g. Neumann, 1998; Cultural Survival, 2005; Dowie, 2009).

More recently, three important trends have altered the colonial legacy of conservation in the region. First, arising in tandem with mass ecotourism in the 1980s, post-colonial governments framed the redistribution of foreign exchange as the primary means through which exclusionary conservation could be “given a human face” (Bell, 1987). In Uganda, for example, the Wildlife Act of 2000 governs ecotourism revenue sharing, and requires all national parks to redistribute twenty percent of gate receipts to the local governments that border protected areas (Government of Uganda, 2000). Second, this rise of international ecotourism also intersected with a broader shift towards decentralization and community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), which sought to mitigate conflicts arising from “fortress conservation” (Brockington 2002) by incorporating policies from human rights-based and participatory approaches to development (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Dressler et al., 2010). Such a shift is at least formally visible in agencies such as the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), which has created new community conservation divisions and appointed corresponding wardens at most national parks since the late 1990s. Third, the prospect of significant revenues from ecotourism synergized with a broader shift from state-driven environmental ‘government’ to hybrid environmental ‘governance’ (Lemos and



Agrawal, 2006) – encouraged, not least, by neoliberal structural adjustment processes and donor conditionalities – and consequently involved both NGOs and the private sector in the management of protected areas. To this end, UWA and other East African conservation agencies have cooperated with private tourism firms and nongovernmental organizations to provide park visitors with a range of services, including accommodation, cultural education, and, in some cases, volunteer experiences. By engaging in joint ventures with the private sector in particular, it was thought that many protected areas could eventually “pay their own way” (Eltringham, 1994) rather than depending on centralized resources transfers from the state.

Since the initiation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) processes at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, however, the ability of protected areas to generate revenue has once again been revolutionized. This time, the rise of markets for ecosystem services, including for biodiversity and carbon offsets, promises to generate both unprecedented park incomes and ‘triple win’ management outcomes for biodiversity, climate change mitigation, and local livelihoods.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, environmental management professionals now consider the above-described benefit sharing and CBNRM schemes to be central not just to traditional conservation efforts, but also for ensuring the sustainable governance of various emerging payment for ecosystem service (PES) initiatives (Sikor, 2013). Many of these schemes depend upon the ability of a land manager or association of land managers to guarantee a specific land use (ie. forest conservation) for a predetermined area and amount of time; hence, they often exclude alternative land uses (such as subsistence agriculture or resource extraction) by default. In these contexts, both informal resistance and formal-legal contestations of land tenure pose omnipresent threats to the feasibility of PES schemes, as they challenge the ‘legitimacy’ of the commodities that are marketed to consumers (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). In East African studies of conservation and development, for example, evidence abounds of disenchanted local populations indiscriminately slaughtering wildlife and clearing protected forests in reprisal for perceived social and environmental injustices (Collett, 1987; Neumann, 1998; Sunseri, 2005; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). Accordingly, effective benefit

---

<sup>1</sup> For a comprehensive review and critique of the literature on market-oriented conservation, see the recent edited volume from Büscher et al. (2014) entitled *Nature™, Inc.: Environmental Conservation in a Neoliberal Age*.

sharing measures and participatory mechanisms are crucial for ensuring the long-term sustainability of PES schemes in both voluntary and proposed compliance markets.<sup>2</sup>

Engaging with these concerns, this report critically examines the ‘triple-win’ logic of park-based PES schemes through a case study of integrated conservation and carbon offsetting at Mount Elgon National Park. Further, in contrast with studies of conservation that have focused on net benefits for aggregated communities (Ferraro et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2012), this report proceeds with an explicit focus on inequality and environmental (in)justice, or on the relationship between perceived injustice and the geographically uneven distribution of positive outcomes for park-adjacent residents.<sup>3</sup> In doing so, I seek to answer the following research questions (RQs):

- (RQ1) What notions of justice do local actors apply to issues of natural resource use and management? What are the key aspects of these notions?
- (RQ2) How do local actors’ notions of justice, their access to and control over resources as well as their livelihood strategies inform their claims of environmental (in)justice (if at all)?
- (RQ3) What are the effects of uptake in higher-level mobilizations on marginalized actors’ claims of (in)justice, and eventually access to and control over natural resources?

The findings of this approach suggest much needed reforms in conservationist benefit-sharing practice at Mount Elgon, in order to account for divergences in the accrual of benefits; to

---

<sup>2</sup> I write this despite Brockington’s (2004) much-cited argument that researchers often overstate the significance of local resistance to protected areas, given that such resistance is usually simply repressed by military and paramilitary state agencies. With the rise of markets for ecosystem services, however, resistance to conservation is perhaps more salient than ever before, given consumer demand for ‘charismatic’ or “virtuous carbon” (Paterson and Stripple 2012) and supply-side incentives to avoid controversy over the sourcing of carbon offsets (see Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> In the interest of concision, I have omitted a review of the vast and rapidly growing conceptual literature on environmental justice. Let it suffice to say that I understand ‘environmental justice’ as encompassing distributive, procedural, and cognitive elements, relating to actual distributions of environmental goods and bads; the formulation of institutions and processes to distribute these; and the ways in which the former two elements are perceived by various stakeholders.

ensure more equitable socioeconomic outcomes; and to prevent ecologically destructive conflicts with park-adjacent residents. Alongside efforts to both implement large-scale PES schemes and mitigate global environmental change, moreover, these concerns are both timely and salient.

Accordingly, this paper will proceed in the following manner: First, I briefly introduce the study area, provide some background pertaining to its management history, and outline the methodology that was used to collect data on benefit sharing practices and outcomes at Mount Elgon. Second, the report addresses the above-identified research questions by presenting findings on the quality and quantity of shared benefits, their asymmetric geographical distribution, and the salience of these in relation to conflicts between local people and park management. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the benefit sharing rhetoric of both the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and its financial supporters in the international development community.

## **2. Study Area, Background, and Methodology**

### **2.1 Mount Elgon National Park (MENP), Uganda**

At approximately 4,321 meters above sea level, Mount Elgon is an extinct volcano that straddles the border between Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda, MENP itself covers approximately 1,121 km<sup>2</sup> of the mountain's 4,000-km<sup>2</sup> basal area (UWA, 2009a, 26). The park borders eight districts, which makes the relationship between MENP and local governments among the most administratively complex in the country. Some of these districts were created as recently as 2010, due to the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) government's policy of administrative decentralization (Grossman and Lewis, 2014). Listed in order from most southeastern to most northeastern, these are: Manafwa, Bududa, Mbale, Sironko, Bulambuli, Kapchorwa, Kween, and Bukwo (Figure 1). Since 2005, the mountain has also been listed as a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve in light of its considerable plant diversity (including several rare species of Afromontane flora), cultural significance, and role as a water catchment area for more than two million people in the surrounding districts (UWA, 2009a).

UWA's headquarters is located in Mbale town, which is the largest urban centre in the area. At present, tourists can access the park from three currently operational gates, located at the villages of Budadiri (Sironko district), Kapkwai (Kapchorwa district), and Kapkwata (Kween district). A fourth gate exists at Suam (Bukwo district), but the trail from this outpost to the Mount Elgon summit is not operational. Additionally, due to poor roads, few tourists enter or exit the park through the Kapkwata park gate. Instead, Kapkwai is the most popular entry point for tourists, both due to its proximity to the beautiful Sipi River waterfall chain, and to associated ecotourism lodges.

Regional UWA offices are positioned at these locations, and rangers operate from a number of outposts scattered between each gate and the Kenyan border. As a result, most of the positive economic and employment feedbacks from ecotourism at MENP are concentrated in Mbale town (where the highest quality hotels and UWA HQ are located), Sironko, and Kapchorwa. Conversely, the southernmost and northernmost districts that border MENP are relatively marginalized from tourist multiplier effects due to the absence of local park entrances and other tourist attractions (Cavanagh, 2011).

## **2.2. Brief Management History**

Over the past several hundred years, two ethnic groups have come to populate what is now the Ugandan side of Mount Elgon: the Bagisu, a group of Bantu agriculturalists (primarily residing in Mbale, Bududa, Manafwa, Sironko, and Bulambuli districts, 2002 population: 1,117,243), and the Sabiny, a Nilotic group of agro-pastoralists (primarily residing in Kween, Kapchorwa and Bukwo districts, 2002 population: 180,594).<sup>4</sup> Further, a group of upland Sabiny known as the Benet (or *mosop* in Kup'sabiny) was evicted from their traditional homes within the forest in 1983 and resettled among the lowland Sabiny (known as *soi* in Kup'sabiny) (Himmelfarb, 2006, 2012). Although the Benet are the only group that is recognized as 'indigenous' by international NGOs such as Cultural Survival (e.g. 2005) and ActionAid (e.g. Okwaare and Hargreaves 2009, see also Box 1), discourses of autochthony are also common among the Bagisu and lowland Sabiny. For instance, the Lugisu term for Mount Elgon, *Masaba*, refers both to the mountain and to an eponymous ancestor from which the group ostensibly descends.

---

<sup>4</sup> These population figures are based on the most recent census (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002).

**Box 1 – Note on the History of the Benet**

The Benet – also sometimes referred to with the derogatory, exogenous, Maa-derived term ‘Ndorobo’ (on the orthography, see Chang, 1982) – are a group of forest-dwelling Sabiny that were left inside the reserve boundary when the British first demarcated it in 1938. Originally, the British did not see the Benet as a threat to the conservation of the area as a result of their relatively small population and sustainable livelihood activities (Webster, 1954; Scott, 1998), as well as, more ominously, debates about whether they and other East African hunter-gatherers should be classified as humans or as fauna (Neumann, 1995). In 1983, the Ugandan government decided to evict these communities from their homes within the protected area boundary, and resettled them among the lowland Sabiny in 6000 hectares of degazetted park land known as the Benet Resettlement Area, but this process was reportedly fraught with corruption and land-grabbing by political and economic elites (Himmelfarb, 2006, 2012). Further, in 1993, when the Mount Elgon Forest Park was upgraded to a National Park, government surveyors declared that 7500 hectares of protected forest had been cleared by local communities, rather than the originally agreed-upon 6000, resulting in the forcible eviction of approximately 6000 people from the 1500 hectares of unsanctioned agricultural settlements (Himmelfarb, 2012). However, in 2005, the High Court in Mbale delivered a ruling in favour of the Benet, which may lead to the restoration of land or financial compensation (Cultural Survival, 2005).

Pre-colonial societies on Mount Elgon certainly practiced ‘conservation’ in a general sense, understood as the formulation and enforcement of institutions related to the sustainable use of land, wildlife, and natural resources (Goldschmidt, 1967; see also Scott, 1998, 14-17). Forests were typically seen as common property rather than as an open-access resource stock, and institutions concerning wildlife, timber, and non-timber resource harvesting were managed via systems of customary authority (Himmelfarb, 2012). When necessary, agricultural extensification into forests was likewise negotiated with customary leaders (Scott, 1998, 15); yet, in the absence of a universal value form (ie. ‘money’), extensification was primarily related to the subsistence or welfare needs of families and clans, rather than the production of large crop surpluses for export to regional markets. Forests were also valued in relation to cultural rites that reinforced a perceived connection with the ancestors and their practices (Scott, 1998; Norgrove, 2002), including for the celebration of ‘twin ceremonies’,

circumcision ceremonies, burial ceremonies, and for the harvest and administration of medicinal herbs.

On the Ugandan side of the border, the protected area model of conservation was introduced when the British colonial state gazetted portions of the mountain as a 'Crown Forest' in 1938 (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, 1098), although initial surveying activities were carried out in the late 1920s (Webster, 1954; Scott, 1998). The initial impetus for forest conservation was primarily related to the need to sustain water supplies to the region's export-oriented coffee industry, which had become a significant source of revenue for the colonial state (Bunker, 1987), as well as to meet demand for timber in the Protectorate (Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2014). Local communities were not consulted regarding the borders of the reserve, and were not compensated for lost access to land and resources, given that the colonial state ostensibly held these "in trust" for future generations (Webster and Osmaston, 2003). Local populations had no formal rights to use resources within the reserve, although they were allowed the "privileges" of limited access for harvesting or grazing under certain conditions (Webster, 1954).

After Uganda achieved independence from Britain in 1962, the consecutive regimes of Milton Obote (1962-1971), Idi Amin (1971-1980), and Milton Obote (again, 1980-1985) – as well as the civil war that brought current president Yoweri Museveni to power in 1986 – precipitated a context in which Uganda's protected areas were generally, and sometimes deliberately, characterized by poor governance (Eltringham and Malpas, 1993; Turyahabwe and Banana, 2008). For example, in an effort to reduce the dependency of Ugandan farmers on cash incomes, Idi Amin's 1975 Land Reform Decree encouraged rural populations to encroach upon protected areas and convert them to agricultural use (Webster and Osmaston, 2003, 167). Moreover, under Obote's second regime, forest conservation officials allegedly sold counterfeit titles to land within the Mount Elgon forest reserve to local farmers, many of whom believed these to be perfectly legitimate (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, 1098). In aggregate, these processes led to the quasi-legal encroachment and deforestation of approximately 25,000 hectares of the forest reserve by 1986 (Scott, 1998; White, 2002).

In an attempt to repair such degradation at Mount Elgon, the Ugandan government upgraded approximately 1,121 km<sup>2</sup> of the mountain to a national park in 1993, with financial assistance from three primary sources: first, from a post-war USAID (1991) programme known as the

National Action Plan for the Environment (NAPE); second, from the Government of Norway, under the auspices of the Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project (MECDP), which began in 1988 with technical assistance provided by IUCN (Scott, 1998; White, 2002); and third, from a Dutch NGO, the Forest Absorbing Carbon Emissions (FACE) Foundation, as part of a carbon offsetting scheme that will be discussed below.<sup>5</sup> In short, and as a consequence of these interrelated initiatives, large numbers of people were evicted from their homes within the newly established national park. Although official records were not kept regarding the scale of these evictions, Vangen (2009) estimates that the overall figure could well exceed 100,000. By comparison, Himmelfarb (2006, 11) found that 6,000 people had faced eviction only in the six parishes he studied in the Benet Resettlement Area, which are among the least-densely populated in the region. Further, Sean White (2002), then IUCN's Chief Technical Advisor for the Mount Elgon region, estimated that the 25,000 hectares of degraded park land could feed approximately 84,000 households. Yet, claiming that all communities within the forest reserve had settled there illegally, the Ugandan government provided no compensation for the loss of land and livelihood that accompanied these evictions (Norgrove, 2002, 255). Given that the region immediately adjacent to MENP is one of the most densely populated areas in rural Uganda, with population densities ranging from more than 800 per km<sup>2</sup> in the southwest to approximately 120 per km<sup>2</sup> in the northwest (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002), such estimates could be plausible. Moreover, based on statistics kept by the Uganda Communications Commission (2010), the total MENP-adjacent population is now approximately 1,592,400. To spatially contextualize this figure, the western-most borders of park-adjacent districts extend not further than 40km from the border of MENP.

### **2.3 Uganda Wildlife Authority-Forest Absorbing Carbon Emissions (UWA-FACE) Project**

---

<sup>5</sup> The FACE Foundation is now known as 'Face the Future' (<http://www.face-thefuture.com/en/>)

One of the pioneering forest carbon projects in East Africa, UWA-FACE was initiated by a contract between the Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Tourism, and Industry (MoTTI) and a Dutch NGO, the FACE Foundation, in 1992 (see FACE Foundation, 1992).<sup>6</sup> Indeed, this is significant, as the world's first voluntary carbon offset contract was signed only in 1989 between between the AES Corporation (a US electricity firm) and an agroforestry project in Guatemala managed by CARE International (Moura-Costa and Stuart, 1998; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 133). The FACE Foundation was a carbon offset pioneer in South America as well, initiating its first project in Ecuador in 1990 (Bumpus, 2004).

According the initial project contract (FACE Foundation, 1992), the purpose of UWA-FACE was to reforest the 25,000 hectares of Mount Elgon National Park that had been degraded throughout the tumultuous post-independence period. FACE agreed to cover the costs of reforestation, including those incurred for labor and procurement. In return, the MoTTI and its subsidiary, Uganda National Parks (UNP),<sup>7</sup> were required to relinquish the rights to market the carbon dioxide stored in the new forest compartments, and to guarantee the security of these new plantations for a period of 99 years. Further, the contract established that these compartments would sequester a minimum of '5,500 kg CO<sub>2</sub> per hectare per year' (FACE Foundation, 1992, 7).

Officials from UWA (2009a, 2011) and the FACE Foundation (1992) initially claimed that the scheme would result in 'triple win' outcomes for climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and local livelihoods. Local labourers were to be employed to reforest the 25,000 hectares of degraded parkland, and seedlings were to be purchased from local farmers. Yet, while the original contract between UWA and FACE stipulates that the former must guarantee the integrity of the newly established tree plantations for a period of 99 years (FACE Foundation 1992; Lang and Byakola 2006), the project had virtually collapsed merely ten years after its establishment. While UWA-FACE's project managers initially set reforestation targets of 1000 hectares per year, actual reforestation fell below 200 hectares by 2002, and had ceased entirely by 2004 (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). By 2002, nearly

---

<sup>6</sup> According to Lang and Byakola (2006, 59), this initial meeting was brokered by Jan Bettlem, a Dutch national working for IUCN in Uganda.

<sup>7</sup> Uganda National Parks later merged with the Game Department to form the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) in 1996, in accordance with the Uganda Wildlife Statute.



44% of the project's compartments had been deforested in whole or in part – an amount of land that exceeded the risk “buffer zone” established by the scheme's external auditors (SGS Agrocontrol 2001). Further, encroachment aside, the project was only able to reforest 8,000 of the planned 25,000 hectares of forest before the cessation of activities in 2002 (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014).

Several years later, the UWA-FACE project reinitiated its activities on a pilot basis in 2009,<sup>8</sup> albeit after being completely redesigned (UWA, 2009b, 2010b). Evidently, both UWA and FACE conceded that the above-noted levels of encroachment, and high likelihood for the exacerbation thereof, were far too salient to continue marketing credits along the established project model. As a result, the scheme was redesigned on a fully ‘collaborative’ basis (UWA, 2009b). Whereas the original model had entailed the establishment of ‘fortress-style’ plantations, this approach involved the use of the ‘taungya system’, or the allocation of plots to individual farmers within areas slated for reforestation. Farmers signed five-year, renewable contracts for practicing agro-forestry within these plots, and accepted responsibility for maintaining the health of their trees at a predetermined density (UWA, 2009b, 14). After UWA deems that the trees have reached maturity (ie. when the new canopy ‘seals’), farmers will be required to vacate their plots and refrain from once again entering the park. FACE agreed to finance this pilot project in park adjacent areas of Bududa district for 2009-2010 (UWA, 2010b). At the time of fieldwork in 2011, the reforestation continued under the authority of the Uganda Wildlife Authority, although continued input and financing from FACE appeared to be uncertain. As of 28 April 2014, there is no information available about past or present FACE activities at Mount Elgon on the foundation's website, and no UWA literature available to suggest continued financing from FACE.<sup>9</sup>

## **2.4 Sampling and Data Collection**

Fieldwork was conducted during September-December 2009 and July-December 2011, consisting of 53 semi-structured interviews, content analyses of project documents, five focus group discussions with UWA-FACE plantation-adjacent communities, and fifty interviews with farmers in ten PA-adjacent parishes that were randomly selected from five districts.

---

<sup>8</sup> For the purposes of both this discussion and clarity, I will refer to this incarnation of the project as UWA-FACE 2.0.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.face-thefuture.com/en/> (accessed 28.04.2014)

First, data on the establishment of UWA-FACE forest compartments at Mount Elgon, their distribution around the protected area, and local encroachment were gathered through semi-structured interviews with employees of the Uganda Wildlife Authority and other Ugandan environmental management agencies, as well as through content analyses of official documents, accounts, and project records. Additional interviews and focus group discussions were then used to cultivate a situated understanding of the manner in which both park managers and local people frame and interpret these processes. Key informants were purposively selected based on their knowledge of the UWA-FACE project and conservation governance at Mount Elgon more broadly. Focus group participants were also selected purposively, based on their involvement with the UWA-FACE scheme.

Quantitative data were obtained from UWA archives and management records, including those pertaining to park visitation statistics, revenue sharing disbursements, budget and income records, and distributions of resource access agreements, which are not available from alternative sources. Additional quantitative data on crop raiding were obtained through group discussions with farmers from ten randomly-selected, park-adjacent parishes in five districts. After a parish was randomly selected, five households from each were purposively selected for their proximity to the park. These participants were asked about the scale of the costs incurred from crop raiding per year, and about the adaptive or evasive strategies employed in response. Narratives were also provided about the broader implications of damages from crop raiding, including its consequences for food security, health, and children's access to education.

In all interviews, participants were selected based on their willingness to participate, as per local customs. Interviews were mostly conducted in English, which is widely spoken even at the village level, although a translator was also employed to assist when individuals preferred to communicate in one of two local languages: Lugisu or Kup'sabiny. A female Ugandan research assistant was also employed to ensure access to female respondents and their children at the village level, as in some cases local customs prevented the author from holding private interviews with this segment of the population.

## **3.0 Results**

This section presents findings related to each of the report's three research questions (RQs). First, I identify key notions of environmental (in)justice expounded by local conservation authorities relative to those expressed by different segments of various local communities (RQ1). Second, I examine how local struggles over access and control over natural resources – as well as the livelihoods that are derived from these – influence local notions of (in)justice (RQ2). Finally, I examine the uptake of what we have termed 'higher level mobilizations', with particular emphasis on the effects of such activities on access to and control over resources (RQ3).

### **3.1 Local Notions of Environmental (In)justice at Mount Elgon, Uganda (RQ1)**

#### *3.1.1 Uganda Wildlife Authority and Related Government Agencies*

First, one should note that a certain – though, admittedly, conservative – vision of environmental justice is implicitly expressed in Ugandan legislation and policy related to the governance of protected areas and other natural resources. Here, the most relevant pieces of legislation are the 2000 Uganda Wildlife Act – which establishes the Uganda Wildlife Authority as the manager of the country's wildlife estate – and the 2003 National Forest and Tree Planting Act, which likewise institutionalizes the National Forestry Authority (NFA) as the manager of the forest estate. These pieces of legislation draw upon the conceptual foundation set by the 1995 Constitution, which identifies the "common good" of current and future generations as the core objective of the government's executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Particularly in relation to the governance of natural resources, the Constitution's rhetoric is reminiscent of relevant colonial law and policy in the Uganda Protectorate, which emphasized the state's role as guarantor and trustee for future generations. Of course, such trusteeship also entailed an assertion of the colonial state's legal and political ascendancy over various customary systems of authority, including those systems that pertained to the management of land and resources (for a thorough discussion, see Mamdani, 1976). After independence, the Ugandan state did not escape this tension between colonial and customary law; to this day, it struggles to reconcile a legal and administrative apparatus predicated on the accumulation of exchange value (ie. 'capital') with customary systems originally designed to maintain natural resource-dependent livelihoods and use values derived from natural resources.

In contrast with colonial law and policy, however, current Ugandan legislation recognizes PA-adjacent communities as rights-bearing stakeholders. For example, Section 69(4) of the 2000 Uganda Wildlife Act stipulates that protected areas must redistribute 20 percent of gate receipts to relevant local governments. Moreover, UWA's official benefit sharing policy claims that the main purpose of these redistributions is to:

“ensure that communities living adjacent to parks obtain benefits from the existence and management of the parks so as to contribute towards improving their welfare and develop partnerships with local communities for conservation and sustainable management of resources outside and inside the parks for the benefit of present and future generations” (UWA, 2000, 1).

One should note, however, that UWA does *not* conceptualize benefit-sharing mechanisms as a means of redressing the damages to local livelihoods entailed by the process of PA institutionalization as such. Rather, benefit sharing mechanisms are perceived as a means of generating marginal improvements in the livelihoods of local communities, while minimizing instances of conflict with the PA arising from costs such as from crop raiding.

Further, the overarching context of administrative decentralization greatly influences the manner in which UWA redistributes benefits from protected areas (Francis and James, 2003; Grossman and Lewis, 2014). Following the Local Government Act of 1997, administrative units in the country are divided as follows: village (local council I), parish (local council II), sub-county (local council III), county (local council IV), and district (local council V). As noted above, the Uganda Wildlife Act stipulates that twenty percent of “park entry fees” must be redistributed through a process involving the parishes that are directly adjacent to protected areas (Government of Uganda, 2000). Accordingly, UWA has complied with this legislation by formulating a ‘community-park institution’ (CPI), which oversees both the revenue sharing process and deliberations over sources of conflict (Archabald and Naughton-Treves, 2001; Tumusiime and Vedeld, 2012). Simultaneously, the agency also cooperates with the Environment and Production Committees (EPCs) that are part of local government at both district and parish levels, which nominate community proposals to receive revenue sharing funds (UWA, 2000). As of 2011, UWA at MENP has funded community projects based on

agroforestry, dairy farming, beekeeping, school construction, and hiking trail establishment for the purpose of ecotourism (UWA, 2009a, 37).

In addition, MENP formally shares ‘benefits’ by negotiating resource access agreements at the parish and village level. These include beekeeping agreements, bamboo collection agreements, boundary management agreements, and collaborative resource management agreements (CRMAs) (Sletten et al., 2008; Moll, 2011). Initially, the CRMAs were a Norwegian-funded and IUCN-designed initiative, associated with the MECDP project, and intended to reduce conflicts between park authorities and local people (Scott, 1998; White, 2002). In addition to beekeeping, bamboo, and collaborative management agreements, UWA has also introduced boundary management agreements, which involve the restoration of park borderlands through the *taungya* system. Essentially, the latter scheme allocates plots to farmers within degraded parkland, which allows them to plant both indigenous tree species and selected crops. When the newly planted canopy ‘seals’ (usually within 5-10 years), farmers are required to return to their communities outside the national park. As mentioned above, a large share of active boundary management agreements exist in Bududa district, as part of a new carbon offset agroforestry scheme with the FACE Foundation (UWA, 2010b). Finally, a small number of communities have also been selected to participate in the East African Community’s Mount Elgon Regional Conservation Programme (MERECP), which involves the establishment of microcredit revolving funds, and plans to offer payments for both carbon sequestration and avoided deforestation in the future (Larsen et al., 2008; Mwayafu and Kimbowa, 2011).<sup>10</sup>

As a result, integral to the state’s implicit vision of environmental justice is the pursuit of ‘Pareto optimality’, defined as a context in which all stakeholders in the governance of protected areas are continually made better off without any party – including the state and its protected area estate – becoming worse off. More colloquially, numerous authors have characterized such rhetoric as belonging to a ‘win-win discourse’ of mutually beneficial conservation and development, which has ostensibly become endemic to conservation policy and practice since the 1980s (see, most recently, Büscher 2014).

---

<sup>10</sup> Financed by Norway and Sweden, MERECP is the successor to the MECDP, and is anchored in the East African Community’s Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC). For other examples of international support for forest and biodiversity conservation in Uganda since 1986, see Box 2.

### **Box 2 – Donor support for evictions from Ugandan protected areas, post-1986**

Following the civil war that brought current president Yoweri Museveni to power in 1986, a number of bilateral and multilateral donors have exerted considerable influence over the nature and extent of the Ugandan forest and wildlife estate. Since the late 1980s, such support has sought to assist the government in regaining control over its protected areas and evicting ‘encroachers’ that settled in these areas during the turbulent post-independence era (see Aluma et al., 1989 and NFA, 2011 for background). Notable programmes include USAID’s \$30 million ‘National Action Plan for the Environment’ (see USAID, 1991), the European Commission’s (EC) ‘Natural Forest Management and Conservation Project’, the World Bank’s ‘Protected Areas Management for Sustainable Use’ (PAMSU) programme, and a number of PA-scale initiatives funded by NORAD in conjunction with IUCN, such as the Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project (MECDP). International conservation NGOs have also supported these objectives, most notably WWF, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), and Flora and Fauna International through their International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) at Bwindi Impenetrable and Mgahinga National Parks. These donors have not always acted in concert with each other, and have occasionally advised the Ugandan government to pursue mutually exclusive objectives (see USAID [2003, 48] for commentary on conflicts between USAID and the EC). However, these projects and programmes collectively raise important concerns related to the transnational dimensions of environmental justice in Uganda, as the resources made available by the above donors appear to have contributed to the uncompensated dispossession of large numbers of PA-adjacent communities. Although the exact number of evictees is difficult to ascertain, the relevant scale appears to be in the hundreds of thousands of individuals (NFA, 2011).

Under such a conceptualization of Pareto optimality, however, foundational grievances related to the construction of the state itself – for example, the alienation of land and resources under colonial rule for the establishment of protected areas – are generally not considered to be eligible for redress.<sup>11</sup> This distinguishes the Ugandan experience somewhat from former

---

<sup>11</sup> In the language of political theory, we might conceptualize such grievances as pertaining to Walter Benjamin’s (1978 [1921]) distinction between ‘law-making’ and ‘law-preserving’ violence. Here, ‘law-making’ violence is understood as being necessarily implicated in the construction of the state, as opposed to the ‘law-preserving’ violence entailed by law enforcement and prosecution activities. Typically, the state perceives law-making

settler societies such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, in which the issue of land redistribution continues to play a salient role in post-independence politics. Consequently, this emphasis on Pareto improvements limits the scope for redistributing incomes and rents from the governance of protected areas to ‘additional’ (ie. above a pre-existing baseline) costs incurred as a result of PA management, or to damages incurred as a result of verifiable excesses on the part of conservation and law enforcement authorities. As we will see, a number of local communities at Mount Elgon premise their opposition to the state’s resource management policies on an assertion of the illegitimacy of Pareto improvements as an organizing principle for environmental justice.

Finally, the state perceives evictions undertaken to remove ‘encroachers’ from protected areas as a justifiable response to the illegal occupation of territory belonging to the forest or wildlife estate (NFA 2011). Crops, livestock, and other property destroyed during the course of evictions are typically conceptualized as the proceeds of illegal activity, and therefore ineligible for compensation. The use of force during evictions is likewise seen as justified – those who resist eviction are essentially perceived as resisting a form of ‘arrest’; what communities describe as a violation of their human rights is usually described by law enforcement personnel as an unfortunate yet necessary response to the criminally recalcitrant occupation of state-owned territory. Although certain segments of the MENP-adjacent community have successfully obtained favourable verdicts in civil legal cases heard the Mbale High Court, UWA maintains that civil law has no bearing of the actual extent of the state’s protected area estate. Instead, UWA and their legal representation insist that only an act of parliament can degazette sections of the national park in favour of local communities.<sup>12</sup> To highlight further sources of tension between these divergent accounts, I now turn to a more detailed discussion of community perceptions of these events.

---

violence as lying beyond the remit of legal redress, whereas it conceptualizes excesses of law-preserving violence in relation to the frameworks of tort law and (more recently, of course) human rights law. However, the (ir)relevance of law-making violence to deliberations over social and environmental justice is a recurrent source of tension between states and various customary authorities, and with indigenous peoples in particular. This applies not just to Uganda, but to all post-colonial societies, such as Canada and Australia.

<sup>12</sup> UWA (2009a, 2010b) and key informant interviews.

### 3.1.2 Park-Adjacent Communities at Mount Elgon

In the first instance, it must be emphasized that the communities living adjacent to Mount Elgon National Park are complex and variegated in terms of their livelihoods, kinship and ethnic ties, formal and informal social and political institutions, and cultural world-views or ‘cosmologies’. Conflicts exist both within and among communities; these manifest most explicitly as ethnicity or clan-based disputes over land, livestock, and resources, but also more subtly as gender-based violence and other intra-household forms of abuse, which are often related to alcoholism (see, for example, Heald 1986, 1998, 1999). Rural life in the area is far from idyllic; it is characterized by deep poverty, hard labour, and recurring financial insecurity, conceptualized as the inability to obtain sufficient access to food, medication, education, and other basic necessities.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, I must first echo Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) warning concerning researchers’ tendency to treat rural communities as homogenous, undifferentiated wholes – at Mount Elgon, ‘local communities’ of course have both the means and the motive to engage in conflicts amongst themselves in relation to any combination of the factors identified above. Likewise, the effects of protected area governance on these communities are similarly varied, leading to increased socioeconomic differentiation between households as a result of asymmetric access to revenue sharing payments, resource access agreements, conservation-related employment, and other benefits. Socioeconomic differentiation also occurs as a result of unevenly borne costs of PA-adjacent residency, such as damages from crop raiding or landslides.

Despite the complexities of the concept of ‘community’ in the Mount Elgon region, a certain level of abstraction and generality is necessary to identify the basic components of local claims to environmental and social justice. Although the idiom or form of expression for claims related to environmental justice may change from context-to-context and actor-to-actor, certain elements of their substance tend to recur. I aim to identify several of these elements below, considering the region’s two main ethnic groups in turn, although I will differentiate between lowland Sabiny (*soi*) and upland Sabiny (*mosop*). As a caveat, I do not claim that all park-adjacent individuals hold these views; only that they have systematically recurred throughout the interviews conducted in the field.

---

<sup>13</sup> See Norgrove (2002) for an in-depth analysis of livelihoods in MENP-adjacent communities.



**Notions of Environmental (In)justice among the Bagisu.** Collectively, the Manafwa, Bududa, Mbale, Sironko, and Bulambuli districts constitute the Bugisu<sup>14</sup> region of Mount Elgon. These districts are among the most heavily populated in Uganda, with densities in excess of 800 persons per km<sup>2</sup> in some areas (UCC 2010). As a result, these districts were among the most affected by large-scale evictions in 1992-3, when the Mount Elgon Forest Park was upgraded to a national park, and in 2002-3, when the national park boundary was re-gazetted with assistance from the World Bank's Protected Areas Management for Sustainable Use (PAMSU) programme.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the most salient grievances related to social and environmental justice among the Bagisu arise as a consequence of these processes.

For example, landless farmers in Bugisu are left with precious few livelihood options, as neither laboring on a more prosperous farmer's property nor migrating to a nearby town in search of work offer realistic prospects for a dependable subsistence income. For young adults, the inability to inherit a parent's land may also limit possibilities for marriage and thus for full social adulthood in one's clan. Consequently, the loss of land is usually and understandably resisted with all available means (see Norgrove and Hulme, 2006 for a review of communities' use of 'the weapons of the weak' at Mount Elgon to resist the loss of land and resource access.)

In conjunction with impoverishment arising from the loss of land, lost access to forests and forest resources also threaten to result in a form of cultural dispossession. For instance, one of the most characteristic aspects of Bagisu society is the collection of bamboo shoots (known in Lugisu as *malewa*) from the forest, the gathering of which reinforces and maintains a perceived connection with the ancestors and their practices (Scott 1998; Lang and Byakola 2006). Forest resources and wildlife are also used to create instruments (such as drums) and traditional costumes for use in birthing, circumcision (*imbalu* in Lugisu), marriage, and burial ceremonies, which often take place within the forest itself. Analysts sometimes overlook the salience of these cultural dimensions of the Bagisu's place-based attachment to Mount Elgon;

---

<sup>14</sup> The collective noun 'Bagisu' refers to the eponymous ethnic group; the term 'Bugisu' is a toponym for the territory that they control.

<sup>15</sup> See Cavanagh (2012) for a national-level overview of controversies related to the implementation of the PAMSU programme.

however, they potentially deepen our understanding of why certain communities are so reluctant to participate in resettlement schemes. This is perhaps particularly evident in the resistance of communities in Bududa district to relocate to Kiryandongo in Central-Western Uganda in order to avoid recurring, large-scale mudslides in the area. In some cases, resettled households actually migrated from Kiryandongo back to Bududa at their own expense (Mafabi, 2010). Not only would such a relocation entail lost access to Mount Elgon's fertile soils and abundant forest resources; it would also denote an abrupt disconnect with several hundred years of rich cultural practices, recognized not least by the mountain's 2009 recognition as a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve.

Further grievances arise from the manner in which evictions were conducted in 1992-3 and 2002-3, as well as from other recurrent and allegedly violent interactions with UWA staff and other law enforcement personnel. Various park-adjacent communities have made allegations of assault, torture, rape, and murder against UWA, police, and military staff (for summaries see Lang and Byakola 2006; Okwaare and Hargreaves 2009; Hurinet-Uganda 2011). In some cases, such violence has led to reprisals against park staff, including the murder of two UWA rangers in 2008 (Mafabi, 2013). In June 2009, assailants from local communities killed another MENP ranger and tortured his colleague before leaving him for dead in the forest (SGS Qualifor 2009, 36).

These and related grievances have resulted in a number of ongoing lawsuits launched by Bagisu communities against UWA and the Ugandan Attorney General, which are being heard by the High Court in Mbale town (Hurinet-Uganda, 2011). Presently, these suits involve two associations of land owners in Manafwa district, and one association in Bulambuli district, collectively totaling approximately 2,900 households or 15,000 people (assuming average household sizes). Although each of the suits differs in the extent of land involved and the quantity of damages claimed by the plaintiffs, they are based on similar premises; namely, human rights abuses inflicted during the process of evictions (especially pertaining to injuries sustained, the loss of land and property, and lost incomes), and surveying errors related to the actual position of the MENP park boundary. In the latter case, at issue are discrepancies between the 1993 and 2002-3 boundaries, which differ by as much as 1km in some areas (UWA, 2010b, 5). In 2005 and 2006, the High Court issued injunctions prohibiting further evictions or destruction of property in disputed territory, but these injunctions were reportedly ignored by UWA (Etengu, 2005).

Although the outcome of these lawsuits remains to be seen, UWA personnel generally downplay the significance of these cases, arguing that civil law has no bearing on the extent of territory controlled by MENP and managed by UWA. Instead, UWA argues that the degazettement of park land can only be achieved by an act of parliament.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, the ongoing lawsuits continue to consume community resources, leading several community leaders to comment that the prolongation of court proceedings is a tactic utilized by UWA to impoverish the communities that have dared to challenge them.<sup>17</sup> In addition, participants in these lawsuits allege that UWA deliberately withholds revenue sharing funds from them. Indeed, as one individual put it during a focus group discussion,

“[r]evenue sharing is a myth. We have not seen it. Instead, the conflict is benefitting UWA. They send proposals for this, and this, and this ... it is a cycle revolving”  
(Community elder, Focus group discussion, August 2011).

Consequently, the highly strained nature of interaction between UWA and these communities appears to have resulted in a ‘vicious cycle’ of park-people interaction, wherein violence and conflict precipitates reprisals by both sides. Moreover, if underlying grievances related to human rights abuses and uncompensated dispossessions are not rigorously addressed, the prognosis for sustainable conservation in Bugisu appears to be grim, given significant potential for further encroachment, violent reprisal attacks, and deliberate clearing of forests.

**Notions of Environmental Justice among the Lowland Sabiny (*soi/soishek*).** To the immediate north and west of MENP, the districts of Kween, Kapchorwa, and Bukwo constitute the Sabiny region of Mount Elgon. In contrast with the primarily agricultural livelihoods of the Bagisu, livelihoods in these districts reflect the pastoralist roots of the Sabiny, who are thought to have gradually migrated southward from Sudan over the last several hundred years (Goldschmidt, 1967; Himmelfarb, 2012). In contrast with the upland Sabiny, however – who previously practiced a primarily hunter-gatherer mode of subsistence – lowland Sabiny continue to pursue a mixture of intensive agricultural and pastoralist livelihood strategies.

---

<sup>16</sup> Interview with MENP warden, 28.07.2011.

<sup>17</sup> Focus group discussion, Manafwa district, 17.09.2011.

Cattle occupy the dominant symbolic position in Sabiny culture, and cattle ownership is closely associated with both upward mobility and social security (Mkutu, 2008). The slaughter of cattle is thus a key aspect of both the Sabiny's circumcision ceremonies and their other cultural rituals (UWA, 2009a). The maintenance of large numbers of cattle denotes the need for expansive grazing areas, but such pastures are increasingly unavailable due to land use pressure and the inability of the Sabiny to compete with the Karamajong and Pokot for grazing land in the plains surrounding Mount Elgon (Himmelfarb, 2012). Indeed, in 2003, a consortium of NGOs in Kapchorwa district claimed that more than 1600 Sabiny had been killed in conflicts with Karamojong cattle raiders over the preceding twenty years (Etengu, 2003). These pressures often lead the Sabiny to graze their cattle inside the park boundaries instead of on the low-lying plains, which has been a source of continuous conflict between the Sabiny and UWA-MENP authorities (Lang and Byakola, 2006). Communities allege that UWA rangers deliberately 'impound' cattle for the purpose of extorting bribes; UWA, by contrast, maintains that its rangers simply have the authority to fine community members for illegally grazing their cattle inside park boundaries.<sup>18</sup>

Yet, frequent changes to the actual position of the MENP park boundary have created uncertainty as to where exactly the Sabiny may legally graze their cattle (Himmelfarb, 2006). Similar to the situation in Bugisu, recurring boundary alterations and subsequent evictions have precipitated a context in which mutually exclusive claims have been asserted to territory between the 1992 and 2002-3 park boundaries. For example, in early 2001, 3000 people were evicted from their homes near the Kapkwata Softwood Plantation, and community members allege that this event was characterized by severe human rights abuses (Ngatya, 2001). Subsequently, the *New Vision* reported that five people died as a result of "poor living conditions" in the temporary camps set up for evictees from the national park (New Vision, 2001). In the case of the Benet Resettlement Area (discussed below), the situation is even more complex, as different boundary demarcation exercises have taken place in 1983, 1992, and 2002-3. As in the case of Bugisu, claims to environmental justice in the Sabiny region of Mount Elgon typically hinge upon grievances and damages related to one or more of the events described above.

---

<sup>18</sup> Interview, UWA Community Conservation Warden, 03.08.2011.

**Notions of Environmental Justice among the Upland Sabiny (*Mosop/Benet*).** The origin and character of the Benet is a source of recurring confusion among scholars, journalists, politicians and development practitioners; however, an understanding of these characteristics is crucial for appreciating the community's claims to social and environmental justice.

In general, this confusion is fuelled by the variety of different terms used to describe this group in colonial and early post-colonial literature, including the El Gonyi, the Kony, the Ndorobo, the Dorobo, and the Ogiek/Okiek, among others. It should be noted that, for the most part, these terms are 'exogenous' in the sense that they are generally not used by the Benet to refer to themselves, although they may occasionally be strategically adopted in certain fora. In particular, as noted by Chang (1982) and Blackburn (1982), the term 'Dorobo' originates from the derogatory Maasai phrase *il torobo*, referring to a person that is too poor to own cattle and must therefore subsist on wild meat and forest products. Blackburn (1982) further suggests a loose ethnic relationship between all of the upland hunter-gatherers in Kenya, as well as the Uganda-Kenya and Kenya-Tanzania borderlands, observing that the Kalenjin term 'Ogiek/Okiek' is often collectively used to refer to all of these groups. Indeed, on the Kenyan side of Mount Elgon, upland Kalenjin-speaking people sometimes use the term 'Ogiek' in reference to themselves.<sup>19</sup>

Hence, as suggested by David Himmelfarb's (2006, 2012) ethnographic research in the Sabiny region of Mount Elgon, the Benet are perhaps best conceptualized as a group of upland Sabiny (*mosop* or *mosopishek* in Kup'sabiny) that was originally left within the boundary of the Mount Elgon Crown Forest when it was initially demarcated by the colonial state in 1938. In this sense, the term 'Benet' refers to the people who were relocated to the Benet Resettlement Area in 1983, rather than to a distinct ethnic group.

Initially, as a condition for remaining within the reserve, the Benet were prevented from cultivating certain kinds of livestock (such as goats), and were required not to clear forest for the purposes of intensive agricultural production (Webster, 1954). Further, although they

---

<sup>19</sup> For example, see the video prepared by communities on the Kenyan side of Mount Elgon for the Forest Peoples Programme, entitled 'The Customary Bylaws of the Chepkitale Ogiek of Mount Elgon': <http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/rights-based-conservation/video/2013/12/video-customary-bylaws-chepkitale-ogiek-mount-elgon> (accessed 20.06.2014).

remained inside the reserve, the Benet were still required to pay a poll tax to the colonial state, despite not receiving any social services in return (Okwaare and Hargreaves, 2009, 11-12).

During the 1970s, forest management officials began to express concerns that the Benet were becoming too populous to continue living within the Mount Elgon forest reserve. In 1972, the Benet received a ten-year “grace period” from the central government, after which they would be evicted (Okwaare and Hargreaves, 2009). During the same year, an organization known as the Benet Lobby Group was formed to campaign for the group’s interests in Kampala, Mbale, and Kapchorwa.

In 1983, the Ugandan government degazetted 6000 hectares of the Mount Elgon Forest Reserve for the purposes of resettling approximately 30,000 Benet (Himmelfarb, 2012). By most accounts, this process was poorly planned and characterized by widespread corruption and mismanagement, with substantial portions of land being allocated to local elites instead of the intended recipients (Scott, 1998; Lang and Byakola, 2006; Okwaare and Hargreaves, 2009; Himmelfarb, 2006, 2012). Although some families were left landless by the resettlement process, no compensation was paid for the loss of land, property, and resource access.

In 1993, when the forest reserve was upgraded to a national park, UWA surveyors found that the Benet Resettlement Area had expanded from 6000 to 7500 hectares. Consequently, approximately 6000 people were evicted from the 1500 hectares of unsanctioned agricultural settlements (Himmelfarb, 2006). Again, no compensation was paid for lost access to land, property, and resources. Due to widespread protests in response, the government established an Inter-Ministerial Task Force in 1994 to examine allegations of human rights abuse, but its inquiries did not materialize in the form of compensation for evictees.

In 1999, the Benet Lobby Group established a formal partnership with the NGOs ActionAid and Uganda Land Alliance to seek redress for these grievances. Together, these organizations established a ‘Land Rights Centre’ in Kapchorwa town in 2001, and began exploring potential legal avenues for obtaining compensation for evictions. When boundary demarcation exercises in 2002-3 again resulted in a further round of evictions, these actors responded by filing a lawsuit against UWA at the Mbale High Court (Businge, 2003).

In 2005, the High Court delivered a consent judgment in favour of the Benet, recognizing them as the “historical and indigenous” inhabitants of the Mount Elgon forest (Cultural Survival, 2005). However, it is as yet unclear how UWA and the Ugandan government will respond to this ruling in the long term, and whether similar rulings will be extended to non-Benet residents of the Sabinu and Bagisu regions of Mount Elgon. As noted in previous sections, UWA maintains that civil law has no bearing over the governance of Uganda’s protected area estate as such, and that only an act of parliament may degazette sections of park territory for use by local communities.

And yet, this High Court ruling raises an interesting politics of indigeneity, the definition of which must now either be extended or retracted to include or exclude other communities in the Mount Elgon region. This is perhaps especially relevant in the case of ongoing lawsuits involving plaintiffs in Manafwa and Bulambuli districts. As suggested above, the nature of the Benet ‘identity’ is primarily socio-economic rather than ethnic or historical in nature, with oral histories suggesting that the Sabinu collectively settled in the region through the same migration process (Goldschmidt, 1967; Himmelfarb, 2012). Yet, it would clearly be advantageous for UWA to now argue that the Benet possess a unique cultural-ethnic claim to the Mount Elgon forest, which cannot be said to hold in the case of the Bagisu and the lowland Sabinu. Currently, such a position appears to be inadvertently supported by NGOs such as Cultural Survival and the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), which recognize the Benet – but not the Sabinu as such – as one of a select few “indigenous” groups in Uganda (see, for example, Cultural Survival, 2014 and IWGIA, 2014).

Having presented the basic characteristics of local notions of environmental (in)justice in the Mount Elgon region, I now turn to the relationship of these grievances and notions of (in)justice to both control over and access to land and natural resources.

### **3.2 Effects of Park-Community Conflicts on Access to Land and Natural Resources (RQ2)**

This section presents findings on the scale of ecotourism-related activity at Mount Elgon, before examining the geographic and socioeconomic significance of attempts to share the benefits deriving from it. In doing so, I suggest that the inequalities arising from this process form both ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ cycles of community park interaction. Particularly in

relation to the latter, inequalities and conflicts pertaining to land and resource access exacerbate local perceptions of conservation as being environmentally unjust, and thus subsequently catalyze ecologically destructive conflicts with park management.

### 3.2.1 Mount Elgon: Ecotourism in Context

Tourism contributes between 9-10 percent of Uganda’s GDP, and the government formally seeks to expand this contribution as part of its current economic growth strategy (Tumusiime and Vedeld, 2012, 18). Substantial debate exists, however, about the extent to which the benefits of tourism accrue primarily to local communities, or whether they are ‘leaked’ to supra-local actors (Sandbrook, 2010; Ahebwa et al., 2011; Sandbrook and Adams, 2012). Similarly, various scholars have expressed concerns that the scale of the benefits from conservation-related ecotourism may in fact be disproportionate to the costs of PA-adjacent residency (MacKenzie, 2012; Tumusiime and Vedeld, 2012; Vedeld et al., 2012). Data on projected MENP incomes for the 2010-11 financial year confirm that these concerns are well-founded (Table 1).

**Table 1: Projected incomes of Ugandan National Parks, 2010-11 Financial Year**


<b>NATIONAL PARK</b>	<b>TOURISM INCOME (USD)</b>	<b>DONOR INCOME (USD)</b>	<b>COMBINED TOTAL (USD)</b>
Bwindi Impenetrable NP	4,495,925	81,690	4,577,615
Murchison Falls NP	1,278,008	0	1,278,008
Queen Elizabeth NP	1,169,799	85,492	5,855,623
Kibale Forest NP	685,420	128,370	813,790
Lake Mburo NP	288,626	215,010	503,636
Mgahinga Gorilla NP	203,923	0	1,317,426
<b>Mount Elgon NP</b>	<b>146,022</b>	<b>50,302</b>	<b>196,324</b>
Kidepo Valley NP	72,542	0	72,542
Rwenzori NP	54,061	0	54,061
Semiliki NP	25,388	0	25,388
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,419,714</b>	<b>560,864</b>	<b>8,980,578</b>

Source: Compiled from UWA (2010a)

In terms of income purely from ecotourism and associated activities, Mount Elgon ranks seventh out of Uganda’s ten national parks for 2010-11, with a projected income from tourism of only 146,022 USD. If we adjust this figure to account for the donor revenues that were also expected to accrue to MENP from the Forest Absorbing Carbon Emissions (FACE) Foundation and the MERECP project in the same year, relative to donor funds that accrued to other national parks, MENP still remains in the seventh ranking.



Further, although UWA (2009a) frequently discusses potential means for increasing the volume of tourists to Mount Elgon, the number of visitors to the mountain has remained relatively marginal over the last ten years (Figure 2). Although annual visitation rose from 500 individuals in 1996 to approximately 3600 in 2008, the scale of such activity is still marginal relative to the local population's demand for land and resources within the national park.




**Figure 2 – Tourist visitors per year at Mount Elgon National Park (MENP), 1996-2010. Sources: UWA (2009a) and key informant interviews.**

Moreover, the number of tourists visiting the area has declined since 2008, when a Belgian national was shot and killed by local poachers during an ascent of the mountain. In addition, a militia known as the Saboat Land Defence Forces (SLDF) launched a rebellion on the Kenyan side of Mount Elgon in 2007-8, resulting in hundreds of deaths and disappearances (Human Rights Watch, 2008, 2011). Subsequently, the Foreign Offices of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States placed travel warnings for Mount Elgon on their advisory webpages for Uganda and Kenya, which the UWA Tourism Warden at Mount Elgon blames for a recent decline in the number of visitors (interview, MENP Tourism Warden, July 2011). Staff members at Mount Elgon also blame journalists and NGOs for publishing reports of alleged human rights abuse at Mount Elgon (e.g. Lang and Byakola, 2006; Checker, 2010; Hurinet-Uganda, 2011), including recent documentary films<sup>20</sup>, for diminishing the desirability

<sup>20</sup> In 2008, the Dutch TV programme 'Zembla' aired a short documentary on the FACE Foundation's carbon offsetting scheme at Mount Elgon entitled 'The CO2 Alibi' (available at <http://zembla.incontxt.nl/seizoenen/2008/afleveringen/02-03-2008>). Hurinet-Uganda also released a film on

of the protected area as a tourist destination. Irrespective of small variations in the volume of tourists visiting the park, however, the scale of this activity is marginal relative to a rapidly growing park-adjacent population of more than 1.5 million individuals (UCC, 2010).

In addition, the potential of ecotourism to alleviate poverty at Mount Elgon is further diminished by the manner in which UWA calculates the percentage of “entry fees” eligible for redistribution to communities. Although the Uganda Wildlife Act of 2000 stipulates that 20 percent of entry fees must be shared, it does not clearly define how this amount should be calculated. This gives UWA a large degree of leeway for determining benefit sharing policy and practice. For example, a non-resident foreign tourist must pay US\$ 90 per day to enter Mount Elgon National Park; however, the amount of revenue available for redistribution is not calculated on this amount, but only on a subset of it (Figure 3).



**Figure 3 – Breakdown of the \$90/day fee to enter MENP. Sources: UWA (2011a) and key informant interviews.**

While UWA collects US\$ 90 per non-resident foreign tourist at MENP park gates, the “gate fee” constitutes only US\$ 25. Consequently, the amount of revenue eligible for sharing is calculated as twenty percent of \$25, rather than \$90. As such, UWA’s community revenue sharing account is credited with only \$5 for every non-resident foreign tourist that visits the park. In addition, not all visitors to the national park pay the full fee – foreign nationals

---

human rights violations at Mount Elgon, entitled *Cry from the Ranges*, in 2009. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIDTRSO9exY> (accessed 19.06.2014).

residing in Uganda, East African Community residents, and Ugandan nationals pay substantially reduced tariffs, which further limit the amount of revenue available for redistribution. Here, the manner in which UWA translates benefit-sharing legislation into practice can perhaps be interpreted as a form of institutional ‘gerrymandering’, or subtle manipulation of existing law and policy to deliberately limit the amount of revenue eligible for redistribution to communities. Further, although the amount of ecotourism revenue available for redistribution is extremely modest, it is also highly unequally distributed, as described below.

### *3.2.2 Divide and Rule? The Political Ecology of Revenue Sharing*

At 1,121 km<sup>2</sup>, Mount Elgon National Park occupies a large swath of both physical and political territory. The park now bisects eight districts, each with its own idiosyncratic leadership and internal politics. Consequently, purportedly technical processes of evaluating project proposals and allocating ecotourism revenue are in practice complicated by the local politics, political ecologies, and political economies of neighbouring districts. Differently put, evidence suggests that UWA often manipulates the revenue sharing process in order to negate local populist movements, rather than simply to fulfill the stated purpose of compensating the communities most adversely affected by conservation.

During both local and countrywide elections, community relationships with MENP predictably form a core aspect of political campaigning in the region. Frequently, opposition candidates will seek to challenge incumbents by promising voters increased access to land and resources within the national park (UWA, 2010b, 4-5). In some cases, populist rhetoric can prompt local residents to encroach upon protected territory even before elections have taken place. Indeed, as one team of auditors concluded while conducting an audit of the UWA-FACE project in 2001, simply,

“[t]here is no doubt that local politicians can gain support by successfully arguing for a re-alignment of the park boundaries to afford their constituents access to more land” (SGS Agrocontrol, 2001, 40).

Perhaps the most blatant example of this occurred after President Yoweri Museveni made a pronouncement in favour of community interests ahead of elections in 2010, after which local

people encroached upon 1,500 hectares of protected land in Bududa, Manafwa, and Mbale districts (Edyegu and Watala, 2010). After winning the election, however, Museveni retracted his statement, and endorsed UWA's enforcement of the existing park boundary.

In response to such political volatility, UWA has sought to exclude politically rebellious communities from revenue sharing programmes (see UWA, 2000). The agency accomplishes this by requiring communities to meet a number of what we might call "interpretively flexible" (Mosse, 2005, 46) criteria in order to remain eligible for assistance. For example, when evaluating proposed revenue sharing projects, UWA (2000, 6, emphasis original) asks the following questions regarding the community's "responsible behaviour":

"Does the community *refrain from illegal activities and assist UWA in fighting illegal activities*? Is the community *aware of the Park* and related conservation issues? Does the community *accept or show tolerance for wildlife on their land*? Does the community help in management of emergencies such as *fighting fires* through reporting and assisting in putting them out?"

At first, these criteria might seem perfectly reasonable. One should note, however, that such "illegal activities" often involve attempts to assert tenure rights to land within the national park, as well as traditional use rights to resources that are not governed by collaborative resource management agreements (CRMAs) (Tumushabe, 2005). Many of these claims are substantive, given that the High Court in Mbale currently deliberates over three cases, and that a fourth was resolved in favour of the Benet in 2005 (Cultural Survival, 2005).

Consequently, UWA's criteria regarding the "responsibility" of prospective grantees are highly political, as they denote that farmers must often choose between asserting rights to land and resources, and accessing shared benefits. At the time of fieldwork in 2011, for example, none of the communities involved with land rights claims had benefitted from either redistributed tourism revenue or resource access agreements. These communities comprise 2,923 households, with a conservatively-estimated average household size of at least 5.1 persons (Norgrove, 2002, 87). Although these groups alone comprise approximately only 1 percent of the population in park-adjacent districts, they still constitute a sizeable population that is apparently categorically denied access to benefits.

Likewise, UWA's other selection criteria are sufficiently flexible to only include communities in benefit sharing schemes when they actively support both UWA and its exclusionary approach to conservation. From this perspective, one can read 'awareness' as 'political support', and 'tolerance for wildlife' as 'willingness to absorb damages from crop raiding'. Similarly, given the local population's dependence on environmental incomes deriving from the national park (Katto, 2004; Sletten et al., 2008), virtually no communities are 'unaware' of the protected area in a literal sense. The further requirement of unpaid labour to assist with park activities also places a rather undue burden on local communities, which are already engaged in time- and labour-intensive agricultural production. Likewise, this criterion is not accompanied by a quantitative figure regarding exactly how much unpaid labour UWA can reasonably expect to receive from local communities.

Such political factors may help to explain broader inequalities in the redistribution of ecotourism revenue at Mount Elgon (Tables 2 and 3). For instance, Manafwa district – where two of three groups involved with land claims are located – has received only 7.7% of redistributed revenue since 2002. This is despite housing 355,400 people, or 22.3% of the park-adjacent population, and 12% of the park-community boundary. Further, the amount of revenue actually redistributed to the district – 7,538,000 UGX or approximately 3,027.31 USD since 2002 – amounts to only 0.0085 USD per district resident over a nine year period. In contrast to the regular and substantial costs of park-adjacent residency, this amount is obviously and vanishingly small.

**Table 2: Park area, human population, and benefit sharing arrangements for districts adjacent to Mount Elgon, Uganda**

District	Park area proportion, %		Population		Benefit sharing arrangements (BSAs)		
	% in district	% of district area	Total	Density	Tourism revenue 2002-2011		Other BSAs
			Persons	Persons/km <sup>2</sup>	Ug.Shs (000s)	%	
Bukwo	26	55.1	70,500	134.29	7,500	7.66	0
Kween	17	21.83	98,900	116.17	18,500	18.91	7
Kapchorwa	12	36.42	109,300	308.26	8,142	8.32	21
Bulambuli	13	21.34	122,300	187.68	3,975	4.06	11
Sironko	9	22.92	233,500	523.61	20,000	20.44	12
Mbale	3	5.88	428,800	826.84	13,744	14.05	5
Bududa	9	41.43	173,700	692.85	18,452	18.86	8
Manafwa	12	21.58	355,400	590.38	7,538	7.70	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,592,400</b>	<b>379.16</b>	<b>97,851</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>64</b>

Other BSAs include Community Resource Management Agreements (CRMAs), Boundary Management Agreements (BMA), Bee Keeping Agreements (BKA), Bamboo Shoot harvesting Agreements (BSA). Sources: UWA (2009a) and UCC (2010).

**Table 3: Tourism revenue payments to districts at Mount Elgon 2002-2011**

District	Payments	Year and amount ('000s of Uganda shillings and percentage)							
		2002	2004	2006	2007	2009	2010-11	Sub-Total	
		UGX	UGX	UGX	UGX	UGX	UGX	UGX	UGX
Bukwo	2	0	3000	0	4500	0	0	7,500	7.66
Kween	4	16000	0	0	0	2500	0	18,500	18.91
Kapchorwa	3	0	0	0	5642	2500	0	8,142	8.32
Bulambuli	1	0	0	0	3975	0	0	3,975	4.06
Sironko	3	0	0	1500	2500	2500	0	20,000	20.44
Mbale	4	0	4000	0	4744	5000	0	13,744	14.05
Bududa	5	0	4000	0	9452	5000	0	18,452	18.86
Manafwa	2	0	0	0	5038	2500	0	7,538	7.7
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>16000</b>	<b>11000</b>	<b>15000</b>	<b>35851</b>	<b>20000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>97,851</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: UWA (2009a)

Likewise, Bulambuli, Bukwo, and Kapchorwa districts were similarly marginalized, accruing only 4.0% (approximately US\$ 1,593.19), 7.7% (US\$ 3,006.01), and 8.3% (US\$ 3,263.33) of shared revenue between 2002 and 2011, respectively. By contrast, the four best-compensated districts – Kween, Sironko, Mbale, and Bududa – collectively received 72.3% (US\$ 28,335.07) of shared revenue. As such, while UWA explicitly provides criteria for projects that can be excluded from its benefit sharing scheme, there appears to be a less comprehensive logic behind the *inclusion* of projects. Indeed, when I asked MENP’s community conservation warden to comment on the uneven distribution of ecotourism revenue around the park, he simply responded that the dispersal of funds is dependent on the quality of proposals that UWA receives (Interview, UWA-MENP warden, August 2011). As a result, revenue sharing funds were continually dispersed without regard for growing inequalities until 2007, when a more balanced approach was implemented. Payments were stopped in 2010 and 2011 to allow for the development of a new, more equitable scheme, which UWA planned to implement in 2013. Under the new model, shared revenue will be evenly dispersed based on a calculation of population and boundary-length indices in each park-adjacent parish (UWA, 2011b).

In addition to the uneven geographical distribution of shared revenue, however, one should also note their temporal distribution - or the manner in which these benefits accrue over time (Table 3) - relative to the nature of costs incurred from crop raiding (Table 4). Although the revenue sharing process is intended to compensate communities that incur heavy damages to their harvests from crop raiding (UWA, 2009a), the process is temporally unsuited to realistically be of any substantive assistance. Put simply, damages from crop raiding are direct, robust, and immediate. These damages can cause acute food insecurity, and diminish the ability of households to procure cash for essential goods and services such as medicines, health care, and education. By contrast, even when redistributed revenue reaches a community that has suffered damages from crop raiding, these resources may accrue years after the fact, and only indirectly. Indeed, all proceeds from the revenue sharing scheme accrue to community enterprises, which begin to generate individual returns to households only after a substantial start-up period. Further, in the event that the established projects are not commercially successful, the returns to individual households can be either meager, or nonexistent.

**Table 4: Extent and cost of crop raiding in districts around MENP, Uganda (N=50)**

District	Crop loss due to raiding (%)			Adaptive Strategies		
	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Avg. Cost/month of adaptation (UGX)	Main Strategy	Avg. Labour time/day
Mbale	20	67	42	48,000	Scarecrows Patrol hut construction	7
Sironko	30	80	50	20,000	Scarecrows	8.5
Bulambuli	35	70	57	50,000	None- Too expensive	12
Bududa	30	70	56	0	Scarecrows	12
Manafwaa	30	70	56	20,000	Scarecrows	12
<b>Average</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>27,600</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>10.3</b>

Source: Group discussions conducted by the author, 2011

Indeed, residents of park-adjacent parishes in five districts collectively reported an average loss of 52.2% of harvests to crop raiding animals in the preceding year (Table 4). Individually reported annual losses ranged from 20% to 80% of total crop yields. In the most disastrous cases, residents described packs of ten or more baboons descending on their fields either shortly before sunrise, or shortly after sundown – times when farmers were least likely to be working or guarding their crops. Respondents also claimed that baboons were more difficult to chase away when raiding in packs, and that they could sometimes pose a threat to small children and livestock. Foxes, bush pigs, birds, rats, and vervet monkeys were also reported to periodically raid crops, although farmers perceived these as posing a less serious threat than baboons.

Consequently, current revenue sharing practices are ill suited for compensating farmers for the costs incurred from crop raiding. Given the small amount of ecotourism revenue available for redistribution at MENP, the strategy of concentrating funds in select projects is understandable, albeit inequitable. However, substantial inequalities also exist in the geographical distribution of other benefit sharing arrangements, which cannot be similarly explained by the scarcity of available resources.

### *3.2.3 Enforcing Scarcity: Environmental (In)justice and the Uneven Geographical Distribution of Resource Access Agreements*

Unlike the procedure for redistributing ecotourism revenue, UWA's approach to establishing other types of benefit sharing arrangements (BSAs) is weakly



institutionalized. For example, despite early efforts by the IUCN to scale up these agreements to all park adjacent parishes (Hinchley, 1998), neither UWA-MENP nor the central UWA administration has published universal regulations for negotiating these agreements with local communities. Yet, as Himmelfarb (2006, p. 10) notes in his study of park-adjacent communities at MENP:

“Within a context of rapidly decreasing yields, limited access to markets, and insecurity of tenure [...] people have increasingly turned to resources from the interior of the park to diversify their livelihoods. [...] As insecurity has been concentrated among communities closest to the forest edge, in-park resource use has become most important to families in those areas.”

In short, park-adjacent communities’ high level of dependence on environmental incomes, combined with UWA’s monopoly over controlling access to these, denotes that power relations asymmetrically skew the negotiation process in favour of the latter (Sletten et al., 2008, 45). Moreover, like the process of revenue sharing, interviews suggest that MENP authorities deliberately use these agreements as leverage in persuading communities to comply with UWA’s directives. As one of MENP’s wardens bluntly observed of the negotiation process:

“We sign these only where minimal conflict exists. If tensions escalate, we do not renew the agreements, or may even terminate them prematurely”  
(Interview, MENP community conservation warden, October 2011).

At the time of fieldwork in 2011, UWA employed five types of these BSAs: Beekeeping agreements (BKAs), community revolving funds associated with the Mount Elgon Regional Ecosystem Conservation Programme (MERECP), Bamboo Collection Agreements (BCAs), Collaborative Resource Management Agreements (CRMAs), and Boundary Management Agreements (BMAs) (Table 5).

**Table 5: Type and geographical distribution of active BSAs at Mount Elgon, 2011**

District	Type of BSA						Total
	BKA	MERECF	BCA	CRMA	BMA		
Bukwo	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kween	2	0	5	0	0	7	
Kapchorwa	5	0	0	8	8	21	
Bulambuli	2	0	1	4	4	11	
Sironko	2	1	5	2	2	12	
Mbale	1	2	0	1	1	5	
Bududa	2	1	0	0	5	8	
Manafwa	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>64</b>	

Source: UWA-MENP management records and key informant interviews, 2011

Overall, a total of 64 agreements were found to exist in 26 parishes. Due to the recent sub-division of districts in the Mount Elgon area, an updated roster of the total number of park-adjacent parishes was not available from UWA. However, prior to the division of Kapchorwa and Mbale into the eight districts that now border the park, Scott (1998, 13) observed the existence of 58 park adjacent parishes. Accordingly, one can infer that the current BSAs are active in substantially fewer than half of parishes that now border MENP.

Accordingly, the uneven distribution of BSAs around MENP exhibits similarities with the distribution of ecotourism revenue. Again, park adjacent communities in Manafwa and Bukwo are marginalized, with both districts enjoying no access to benefit sharing arrangements. Further, out of a total of 64 agreements, nearly 33% were concentrated in Kapchorwa district, which houses only 6.86% of the park-adjacent population. Likewise, only five BSAs were active in Mbale, which houses nearly 27% of the park adjacent population, and eight in Bududa, which is home to 11% of the neighbouring population. Consequently, like benefits accruing from revenue sharing schemes, existing BSAs are concentrated in the districts that receive the greatest benefits of tourism at MENP. Indeed, 51.5% of agreements are located in Sironko and Kapchorwa, which also host both the two most active MENP park gates and tourist attractions near the Sisyi and Sipi waterfalls, respectively.

#### *3.2.4 Summary: 'Vicious' and 'Virtuous' Cycles of Community-Park Interaction*

First and foremost, then, these findings highlight both procedural and distributive injustices in current benefit sharing arrangements around MENP. Both the uneven

distribution of actual benefits and recurring attempts to bend procedures to fit management objectives suggest that UWA has appropriated the benefit sharing process for political reasons. Further, local communities' cognizance of these processes delegitimizes benefit-sharing processes, and exacerbates grievances against conservation in the area. For example, congenial relations between park staff and local communities constitute a prerequisite for both the disbursement of ecotourism revenue, as well as the negotiation of other resource access agreements. Communities that are in open conflict with PA authorities were found to be less likely to benefit from a resource access agreement. Further, UWA requests that communities contribute to the monitoring and enforcement of PA regulations in exchange for access to resources. In some cases, this can result in a relatively substantial amount of unpaid labour for individuals who are already quite taxed in terms of workload and other non-productive forms of labour, such as anti-crop raiding activities. Also crucial for the establishment of a resource access agreement is the ability to diversify livelihoods in order to avoid PA encroachment and other illegal income generating activities. Such breaches of park regulations have been found to increase the potential for conflict, which in turn limits the ability of communities to negotiate with the PA.

Hence, these relations can be conceptualized as forming two distinct categories of cycles: one 'vicious' and the other 'virtuous'. Virtuous cycles arise when communities diversify their livelihoods away from subsistence agricultural dependency and 'illegal' incomes. Such abstinence improves the odds that communities will negotiate resource access agreements and other benefits with PA officials, and, by implication, move further away from illegal or provocative activities. By contrast, vicious cycles form when, due to inadequate access to legitimate enterprises or resource stocks, communities supplement their agricultural livelihoods with income from encroachment, poaching, or illegal resource collection. Here, the perceived illegitimacy of conservation strains relations with PA authorities, leading to protracted conflicts (either in court or through physical violence), and preventing the formation of benefit sharing agreements. Although not all-illegal activity is due to socioeconomic desperation, it may be a salient factor in many cases, especially where the loss of land or livelihood is at stake.

Conversely, in areas where communities benefit from ecotourism from MENP, it is perhaps easier to refrain from illegal resource use, and, by extension, more realistic to amicably liaise with park officials. Communities in Mbale, Sironko, and Kapchorwa districts, for example, benefit from the multiplier effects of tourism, as well as from concentrated benefits such as redistributed ecotourism revenue and other BSAs. By contrast, areas that are marginalized from MENP ecotourism impacts, such as Manafwa and Bukwo districts, may face fewer incentives to refrain from committing resource use crimes such as agricultural encroachment, timber harvesting, or the harvesting of forest products.

### **3.3 Effects of Higher-Level mobilizations on Claims of (In)justice and Access to Natural Resources (RQ3)**

Throughout the course of the conflicts over land and resources discussed in Section 3.1, various communities at Mount Elgon have attempted to engage in what we will term ‘higher level mobilizations’. Differently put, certain communities have attempted to “jump scales” (Smith, 1992; Harvey, 1996) in order to bring their local resource conflicts to the attention of wider audiences, and to link their struggles to the global politics of biodiversity conservation and development.

This has taken a variety of forms, most notably in engagement with national and international NGOs; the formation of cooperative unions to secure market leverage for key cash crops (such as coffee, see Bunker, 1987); the use of legal mechanisms for dispute resolution; and the production of documentary videos and related literature. Engagement with journalists and researchers constitutes an additional form of ‘scale jumping’, in which communities potentially reach scholarly audiences and other publics by providing their narratives on conservation and resource conflicts.

Given the variegated forms and effects of these higher level mobilizations, I must deal with different empirical cases in turn. In what follows, I first discuss higher level mobilizations in relation to the Benet resettlement process, before engaging with the case of the UWA-FACE carbon offsetting project.

### *3.3.1 Higher Level Mobilizations, the Benet Resettlement Process, and the Politics of Indigeneity*

Members of the Benet community have long sought to “jump scales” in order to bring their struggles to the attention of a broader audience. Such strategies date back to at least 1972, when community leaders formed the Benet Lobby Group to protest their impending eviction from the Mount Elgon Forest Reserve. Although members of the Benet community had expressed discontent with forest management policies on Mount Elgon since the early twentieth century – and particularly in relation to the colonial state’s imposition of a poll tax without providing any accompanying social services (Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2014) – the threat of complete removal from the forest catalysed an unprecedented degree of social mobilization. As Okwaare and Hargreaves (2009) note in their retrospective overview of Benet mobilization, this activity has been firmly rooted in the community’s cultural-ethnic identity, which emphasizes continuity with their ancestor’s stewardship of the Mount Elgon forest.

These mobilizations have led to a number of notable outcomes. In 1994, pressure from the Benet Lobby Group’s protests of the 1993 evictions process led to an inquiry by an Inter-Ministerial Task Force that was especially formulated for this purpose. Although the ensuing report recommended that all of the 7500 hectares occupied by the Benet should be degazetted from MENP, this recommendation was ignored by Uganda National Parks (then the agency responsible for MENP), who insisted that the Benet Resettlement Area should only correspond to the 6000 planned hectares. In 1993-1994, approximately 6000 people were evicted from these 1500 disputed hectares without compensation (Himmelfarb, 2006).

In 1999, and in response to the furore over these evictions, the NGO ActionAid established a partnership with both the Benet Lobby Group and the broader Benet community. Their activities focused on “capacity building, organized peer exchanges to other minority and indigenous groups in Kenya and Uganda, advocacy support, and contact with organized landless groups from other parts of the world” (Okwaare and Hargreaves, 2009, 12). Perhaps inspired by such ‘peer-exchanges’ with Kenyan forest-dwelling indigenous groups and their various legal struggles against the Kenyan state, Benet community members launched a lawsuit against UWA and the

Ugandan Attorney General in 2003. The community was supported by ActionAid and another national NGO, the Ugandan Land Alliance, both before and during the legal process. These organizations generated considerable publicity for the Benet community in their respective websites, social media campaigns, organizational literature, and broader professional activities (workshops, conferences, other stakeholder fora) both in East Africa and abroad.

Arguably, such advocacy has led to the Benet's uptake as one of a select few "indigenous groups" in Uganda, as defined by organizations such as Cultural Survival, the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), and Forest Peoples Programme. These organizations each include the Benet as one of only 3-4 "indigenous groups" in Uganda, including the Batwa (living near Bwindi Impenetrable and Mgahinga National Parks in South-western Uganda), and the Karamojong, a pastoralist group living on the plains north of Mount Elgon (see Cultural Survival, 2014; IWGIA, 2014). Whereas Cultural Survival (2014) only recognizes these three groups as 'indigenous', the IWGIA (2014) additionally recognizes the Ik, an upland hunter-gatherer group featured in Colin Turnbull's (1972) controversial ethnography, *The Mountain People*.

In 2005, a consent judgment of the Mbale High Court likewise recognized the Benet as the "historical and indigenous" occupants of the Mount Elgon forest (Cultural Survival, 2005), which was widely celebrated as a success by ActionAid, the Uganda Land Alliance, and related NGOs. In 2009, this led ActionAid to publish a report on the Benet community's struggles as part of their much-discussed *Critical Stories of Change* series (Okwaare and Hargreaves, 2009). However, despite its positive reception in the NGO community, this consent judgment was largely ignored by UWA and law enforcement agencies, which continue to enforce the 1993 and 2002-3 MENP boundaries. Indeed, in early 2008, UWA and UPDF undertook corresponding evictions that reportedly left at least 4000 Benet homeless, infuriating local leaders, NGOs, and politicians (Jaramogi, 2008).

In 2010, the Benet's status as an indigenous group was again solidified by a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Anaya, 2010). This report was prompted by further uncompensated evictions of Benet families in 2008,

which occurred despite – or perhaps in spite of – the Mbale High Court’s 2005 consent judgment. In its appraisal of the impacts of this process on the Benet community, the report concluded that “no effective recognition of the Benet peoples’ land or natural resource rights before, during or after the establishment of the Mt. Elgon National Park” had occurred, and that “it is necessary to ensure adequate redress for the resettlement and its ongoing effects on the Benet people” (Anaya, 2010). Although the Special Rapporteur requested a response to its report from the Ugandan government, none was received. To date, Uganda has passed no legislation and issued no official policy statements to specifically address or recognize the rights of ‘indigenous’ peoples (IWGIA, 2014).

Consequently, it would appear that the successes experienced by the Benet community have been primarily symbolic, and may actually be inversely correlated with their ability to access land and natural resources without the interference of natural resource management authorities. Although the community has been highly effective at obtaining the support of national and international civil society organizations; in winning favourable legal cases; and in having its status as an indigenous group recognized by multilateral agencies, these successes appear to have had little formal bearing on the community’s ability to access natural resources. In some cases, progress in civil society and legal fora may have actually exacerbated the community’s relationship with UWA, leading to both formal and informal conflicts with law enforcement personnel.

Further, the decision by the Benet community and related NGOs to premise their claim to land and resources on an exceptional ‘indigenous’ status has given rise to an interesting, though somewhat problematic, politics of indigeneity in the Mount Elgon region. As discussed in Section 3.1, the Benet are perhaps most accurately perceived as a subset of the Sabiny ethnic group, which was initially distinguished from other Sabiny clans primarily for socioeconomic rather than ethnic or cultural reasons. Indeed, all Sabiny share a common language (Kup’sabiny), and common cultural and cosmological beliefs concerning their relation to Mount Elgon and its forests (Himmelfarb, 2012). However, due to the rhetoric that has been strategically adopted by NGOs such as ActionAid and Cultural Survival, the Benet are now widely thought to be a separate ethnic group with a more ‘legitimate’ claim to forest resources than

other related clans of Sabiny, who may in practice live only a few kilometres away, and maintain nearly identical livelihood strategies. One could make a similar argument for the Bagisu communities living to the south and west of MENP, whose struggles against integrated conservation and carbon offsetting are discussed in more detail below.

### *3.3.2 Higher Level Mobilizations and the UWA-FACE Project*

Perhaps the most obvious examples of higher-level mobilization at Mount Elgon have arisen in relation to the UWA-FACE carbon offsetting project. As described in Section 2.3, the UWA-FACE scheme was initiated by a contract between the Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Tourism, and Industry (MoTTI) and a Dutch NGO, the FACE Foundation, in 1992 (see FACE Foundation, 1992). According to Lang and Byakola (2006, 59), this initial meeting was brokered by Jan Bettlem, a Dutch national working for IUCN in Uganda, who introduced the FACE Foundation both to MoTTI and to the management of the Mount Elgon Forest Reserve.

In the first instance, one might argue that this project was *itself* a form of higher-level mobilization, albeit one instigated by conservationists rather than local communities. Indeed, following the restoration of relative stability to the country by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in 1986, the international environment and development community widely perceived Uganda as being open for 'business', perhaps in a context of what Woods (2011) perceptively terms "ceasefire capitalism." As a result, bilateral and multilateral donors provided a number of high-value grants and loans to the Ugandan government for the purposes of restoring its control over the country's forest and wildlife estate – initiatives that were warmly welcomed by the fledgling NRM regime (See Section 3.1.1, Box 2). These included country-wide programmes funded by USAID (1991, 2003), the World Bank, and the European Community. In addition, at Mount Elgon, a PA-specific project was funded by NORAD and implemented by IUCN, entitled the Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project (MECDP). Further, these initiatives must also be seen in the context of the first Rio summit on sustainable development in 1992, which led to the creation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change



(UNFCCC) and UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), to which Uganda became a signatory.

As a consequence of these interrelated conventions, projects, and programmes, it is estimated that several hundred thousand individuals were evicted from protected areas across Uganda (see NFA, 2011). Given the personal connections between IUCN and the FACE Foundation, it is likely that the latter was cognizant of these processes, and viewed the restoration of stability to the country as an opportune time to expand its operations from South America to East Africa. Although the international development community was beginning to express an unprecedented degree of interest in biodiversity conservation, the integration of conservation and carbon offsetting was a decidedly novel concept in early 1990s. As a result, the FACE Foundation's pioneering 1992 agreement with the Ugandan government must be seen both as an innovative programme, and as an important *discursive* event that contributed to a growing conceptualization of tropical, forested protected areas as carbon sinks as well as biodiversity hotspots.

It was not long, however, before local communities, civil society organizations, journalists, and researchers began to challenge the legitimacy of the UWA-FACE project. In the first instance, such challenges emerged as a result of the relationship between the project's implementation and the uncompensated eviction and dispossession of local residents that characterized the upgrading of the Mount Elgon Forest Park to a National Park in 1993. Indeed, these communities were evicted from the very same territory that was slated for reforestation by the UWA-FACE project, and it is possible that the ruins of razed communities were still visible when reforestation began in 1994 (for a fuller discussion of the evictions process, see Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014).

Throughout the 1990s, David Mafabi and number of other Ugandan journalists provided critical coverage of these evictions for the newspaper *New Vision*, which began a trend of critical reportage and analyses both on the UWA-FACE project and conservation at Mount Elgon more broadly. These conflicts also attracted a number of academic researchers to the region, notably from Makerere University, Aberdeen

University, Leeds University, and Dundee University,<sup>21</sup> as well as the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, initially through commissioned appraisals of NORAD support to the MECDP project. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Linda Norgrove from the University of Manchester and David Himmelfarb from the University of Georgia also conducted extensive doctoral research in the region, producing some of the most detailed knowledge on livelihoods and resource conflicts at Mount Elgon to date (see Norgrove, 2002; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Himmelfarb, 2012).

By the early 2000s, these activities had also attracted the critical attention of civil society and advocacy organizations, both in Uganda and abroad. As noted in the previous section, ActionAid began its longstanding cooperation with the Benet community in 1999. In Bugisu, however, evictions associated with the UWA-FACE project caught the attention of Timothy Byakola (Climate and Development Initiatives, Uganda), then eventually Jutta Kill (FERN) and Chris Lang (World Rainforest Movement). Inquiries by these researchers eventually led to the publication of Lang and Byakola's (2006) excellent *A Funny Place to Store Carbon* report in 2006, which became widely read and discussed not just among researchers and professionals working on Mount Elgon, but also among the environment and development community more broadly. Indeed, one could argue that this report constitutes something of an archetypal example of critical research on carbon offsetting and other PES projects, providing substantial inspiration for researchers and civil society practitioners in a variety of different contexts.

Following the publication of Lang and Byakola's (2006) report and associated articles (Lang, 2005, 2008; Byakola and Lang, 2006), the UWA-FACE project obtained a certain degree of notoriety among the international environment and development community, becoming known as something of a 'worst-case' scenario among both academics and practitioners (see Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). Indeed, this report prompted a veritable barrage of negative reportage, including a critical piece in *Fortune* magazine (Faris, 2007) and various articles in Ugandan and international media outlets (e.g. Wambi, 2009). Academic critiques of the project were also later published by Melissa Checker (2009, 2010) and Sian Sullivan (2011).

---

<sup>21</sup> Through the 'Project Elgon' research programme: <http://www.see.leeds.ac.uk/misc/elgon/elgon.html>.

In 2008, these controversies resulted in the production of a short documentary, which was aired by the Dutch TV programme ‘Zembla’ – entitled ‘The CO<sub>2</sub> Alibi’ – featuring several communities with grievances against the UWA-FACE project.<sup>22</sup> The documentary was highly critical of both the UWA-FACE project and carbon offsetting in general, leading to considerable debate among the Dutch public (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). One year later, the NGO Hurinet-Uganda also released a documentary on alleged human rights abuses on Mount Elgon with funding from Diakonia-Sweden. Entitled *Cry from the Ranges*, the documentary features testimonies from communities living adjacent to MENP, detailing abuses allegedly suffered at the hands of UWA rangers, and hardships resulting from dispossession from land and natural resources.<sup>23</sup> In addition to the loss of property, community members testify about assaults, torture, rape, and sexual assaults allegedly inflicted by UWA and UPDF during law enforcement activities. Aside from the provision of narrative testimonies, the film also depicts injuries allegedly inflicted during the evictions process and subsequent conflicts with UWA personnel.

As in the case of the Benet’s engagement with advocacy organizations, the negative publicity attracted by the UWA-FACE project does not appear to have improved communities’ access to land and resources in any straightforward fashion. Three land-based lawsuits are currently ongoing in Manafwa and Bulambuli districts, and, in each case, injunctions were issued by the Mbale High Court in 2005-6 to prevent further evictions. However, these measures appear to have been ignored by UWA personnel, who maintain that only an act of parliament may degazette sections of the national park in favour of community possession.

Conversely, negative press and civil society coverage appear to have retained substantial implications for the UWA-FACE project’s ability to both produce and market carbon offsets derived from Mount Elgon forest plantations (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). Specifically, reforestation activities declined in response to both


---

<sup>22</sup> Available at: <http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/1252989> (accessed 22.06.2014).

<sup>23</sup> Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIDTRSO9exY> (accessed 22.06.2014).

mounting conflicts with local people and negative press and NGO coverage of the project (Figure 4).


**Figure 4 – Actual UWA-FACE Reforestation vs. Management Targets (in hectares).**



Source: UWA (2011) and semi-structured interviews.

After the project’s implementation in 1994, reforestation targets were either met or exceeded until the late 1990s, when reforestation began to rapidly decline, coming to a halt by 2004. Essentially, ongoing conflicts and encroachment into forest plantations began to seriously challenge the project’s ability to guarantee the provision of actually-existing environmental services, given that the number of forest compartments encroached exceeded the ‘risk buffer’ established by the project’s auditors (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014, Figure 5). Indeed, only approximately 8,000 of 25,000 planned hectares were reforested before the project was forced to stop its operations. By 2004, up to 44% of the project’s newly established forest compartments had been encroached upon by local communities (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014).

**Figure 5: Encroachment into UWA-FACE plantations, 1994-2002.**



Source: UWA (2011) and semi-structured interviews.

Following the rise of legal challenges to land involved with the UWA-FACE project in the early 2000s, UWA and the FACE Foundation redesigned their project on a pilot basis, seeking to implement a fully ‘collaborative’ model (UWA, 2009b). Whereas the project had originally entailed the establishment of ‘fortress-style’ plantations, this approach involved the use of the *taungya* system, in which farmers signed five-year, renewable contracts for practicing agro-forestry (UWA, 2009b, 14). FACE agreed to finance this pilot project in park-adjacent areas of Bududa district for 2009-2010 (UWA, 2010b), but, at the time of fieldwork in 2011, continued input from FACE appeared to be nonexistent. As of 28 April 2014, there is no information available about past or present FACE activities at Mount Elgon on the foundation’s website, and no UWA literature available to suggest continued financing or involvement from FACE.<sup>24</sup> However, the most recent public summary available from SGS Qualifor (2009) suggests that the project’s FSC certification was valid until at least 30.09.2012, although no evidence is currently available that it has been renewed. Both FSC and SGS Qualifor have been heavily criticized by Lang (2008) and Lang and Byakola (2006) for certifying the UWA-FACE project despite widespread and well-documented conflicts over land involved in the project.

Consequently, whereas conflicts between communities and UWA do not appear to have improved the former’s access to land and resources above a pre-existing baseline

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.face-thefuture.com/en/> (accessed 28.04.2014)

scenario, they do appear to have compromised UWA and FACE's ability to market carbon offsets from disputed territory. This is the case both literally, as communities have significantly encroached upon UWA-FACE forest plantations, and more symbolically, as negative press coverage has stigmatized the project's activities both in the region and far beyond. As such, one can perhaps infer from this case that carbon offset projects depend not only upon the reliable and verifiable sequestration of carbon dioxide, but also on the maintenance of a 'triple-win' spectacle of forest conservation that is simultaneously beneficial for communities, biodiversity, and the climate (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014). When such an account of project activities is undermined by independent evidence, its ability to sell its environmental services may be challenged, even if its ability to sequester carbon dioxide is not.

#### **4.0 Conclusion**

This report has identified procedural, distributive, and cognitive elements of environmental injustice in relation to integrated conservation and carbon offsetting at Mount Elgon National Park in Uganda. Whereas the deleterious socioeconomic effects of conservation were found to be both robust and acutely experienced, shared benefits were relatively meager, highly unequally distributed, and temporally unsuited to serve as compensation. These inequalities and inconsistencies result in a situation in which local people perceive conservation at Mount Elgon as being illegitimate, and such perceived illegitimacy, in turn, exacerbates ecologically destructive conflicts with park management authorities.

Further, although UWA (2011b) adopted new revenue sharing guidelines to address such inequalities in 2013, the efficacy of efforts to redistribute the benefits of conservation have to date been limited by the political or instrumental character of their implementation. In other words, UWA's tendency to use benefit sharing arrangements as either a reward for compliance or a punishment for noncooperation has resulted in the formation of 'vicious' and 'virtuous' cycles of park-community interaction. Such patterns serve to further concentrate benefits within already better-off communities, while allowing poorer communities to descend into a vicious cycle of marginalization from benefits, conflict, and illegal activity. While the new revenue

sharing guidelines' focus on equity constitutes a positive development, the actual amount of revenue redistributed to each community will become even less robust, as it will be spread among a far larger set of beneficiaries.

To supplement these new revenue sharing procedures, this study concludes by recommending that nonfinancial benefit sharing arrangements should be universally implemented in all park-adjacent parishes. At present, fewer than half of the parishes neighbouring MENP enjoy legal access to non-timber forest products and fuelwood from within the park. An entitlement-based approach to these agreements would prevent resource access from being used as a political tool by conservationists and politicians, and would simultaneously reduce inequalities in resource access between communities. Further, the comprehensive negotiation of access agreements would also reduce inequalities within individual villages, by improving women and children's legal access to water, fuelwood, and other resources. Although Ugandan national parks will continue to face a number of pressures related to both rising adjacent populations and insufficient ecotourism revenue in the coming years, modest initiatives like these may yield tangible improvements in the lives of those most affected by internationally-supported efforts to conserve biodiversity in Uganda.

### **Acknowledgments**

This report was commissioned by Thomas Sikor for the I-REDD Project funded by the European Union (grant no. 265286) and an ESRC/DFID Development Frontiers Award (no. ES/K012460/1). I would like to thank both Thomas Sikor and Janet Fisher for guidance and comments on previous versions of the text, Pål Olav Vedeld for his supervision of my fieldwork in Uganda, and all those at Mount Elgon who shared their time and perspectives with me. I would also like to thank Chris Lang, Dave Himmelfarb, and Adrian Nel for useful comments, resources, and discussions, and Charlotte Nakakaawa for assistance in compiling quantitative data.

### **References**

- Adams, W.M. 2003. Nature and the colonial mind. In W.M. Adams and M. Mulligan (eds), *Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era*. London: Earthscan, pp. 16-50.
- Agrawal, A., Gibson, G. 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: The role of community in natural resource conservation. *World Development* 27(4): 629-649.
- Ahebwa, W.M. and R. van der Duim and C. Sandbrook. 2011. Tourism revenue sharing policy at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda: A Policy Arrangements Approach. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism*. iFirst 2011, 1-18.
- Aluma, J. and C. Drennon, K. Emmanuel, J. Kigula, S. Lawry, E.S.K. Muwanga-Zake *et al.* (1989). *Settlement in Forest Reserves, Game Reserves, and National Parks in Uganda: A Study of Social, Economic, and Tenure Factors Affecting Land Use and Deforestation in Mabira Forest Reserve, Kibale Forest Reserve, and Kabale Game Reserve-Corridor*. Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research and University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- Anaya, J., 2010. *Uganda: Situation of the Benet Community Living in the Kapchorwa District of Eastern Uganda, on the Edges of Mount Elgon*. A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 15 September 2010. URL=<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/cases-2010/31-uganda-situation-of-the-benet-community-living-in-the-kapchorwa-district-of-eastern-uganda-on-the-edges-of-mount-elgon> (accessed 21.06.2014).
- Archabald, K., Naughton-Treves, L., 2001. Tourism and revenue-sharing around national parks in Western Uganda: Early efforts to identify and reward local communities. *Environmental Conservation* 28 (2), 135-149.
- Bell, R., 1987. Conservation with a human face: Conflict and reconciliation in African land use planning. In *Conservation in Africa: People, policies and practice*, eds D. Anderson and R. Grove, 79-102. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Benjamin, W., 1978 (1921). Critique of violence. In *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings* (pp 277–300). New York: Schocken.
- Blackburn, R.H., 1982. In the land of milk and honey: Okiek adaptations to their forests and neighbours. In E. Leacock and R. Lee (eds), *Politics and History in Band Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 283-305.
- Brockington, D. 2002. *Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania*. James Currey, Oxford.
- Brockington, D., 2004. Community conservation, inequality and injustice: Myths of power in protected area management. *Conservation and Society* 2(2): 411-432.
- Bumpus, A.G. 2004. CPR for Climate Change? Understanding the Effective Reciprocity of a Carbon Sequestration Project as a Common Pool or Privately Owned Resource in Highland Ecuador. Unpublished Master's thesis. King's College, London.
- Bumpus, A.G., Liverman, D.M. 2008. Accumulation by decarbonization and the governance of carbon offsets. *Economic Geography* 84 (2), 127-155.
- Bunker, S. 1987. *Peasants Against the State: The Politics of Market Control in Bugisu, Uganda, 1900-1983*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Businge, G., 2003. Benet to sue gov't over land. *New Vision* (01.10.2003). URL=<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/26/309690> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Byakola, T., Lang, C., 2006. Uprooted. *New Internationalist* 391. URL=<http://newint.org/features/2006/07/01/uganda/> (Accessed 14.06.2014).



- Büscher, B., 2014. Selling success: Constructing value in conservation and development. *World Development* 57: 79-90.
- Büscher, B., Dressler, W., Fletcher, R. (eds), 2014. *Nature™, Inc.: Environmental Conservation in a Neoliberal Age*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
- Cavanagh, C. 2011. *Protected Areas and Poverty in Africa: Four Cases*. Report prepared for the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA). NINA, Oslo.
- Cavanagh, C. 2012. *Unready for REDD+? Lessons from Corruption in Ugandan Conservation Areas*. Policy Brief for U4 Anti-Corruption Center, Chr. Michelsen Institute. U4/CMI, Bergen, Norway.
- Cavanagh, C., Benjaminsen, T.A., 2014. Virtual nature, violent accumulation: The ‘spectacular’ failure of carbon offsetting at a Ugandan national park. *Geoforum* 56: 55-65.
- Cavanagh, C., Himmelfarb, D. 2014. “Much in Blood and Money”: Necropolitical Ecology on the Margins of the Uganda Protectorate. *Antipode* 47 (1): 55-73.
- Chang, C. 1982. Nomads without cattle: East African foragers in historical perspective. In E. Leacock and R. Lee (eds), *Politics and History in Band Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 269-282.
- Checker, M. 2009. Double jeopardy: pursuing the path of carbon offsets and human rights abuses. In S. Böhm and S. Dahbi (eds), *Upsetting the Offset: The Political Economy of Carbon Markets*. Mayfly Books, London, pp. 41-56.
- Checker, M., 2010. Double jeopardy: Carbon offsets and human rights abuses. *Synthesis/Regeneration* 51. Available at <http://www.greens.org/s-r/51/51-01.html> (accessed 10 April 2012).
- Collett, D., 1987. Pastoralists and wildlife: Image and reality in Kenya Maasailand. In: *Conservation in Africa: People, Policies, and Practice*, eds D. Anderson and R. Grove. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Cultural Survival, 2005. Momentous ruling recognizes land rights of indigenous community. URL= <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/katie-meyer/momentous-ruling-recognizes-land-rights-indigenous-community> (accessed 10 June 2012).
- Cultural Survival, 2014. Uganda country profile. URL= <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/Uganda-Country-Profile> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Dowie, M., 2009. *Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict between Global Conservation and Native Peoples*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Dressler, W., Büscher, B., Schoon, M., Brockington, D. A. N., Hayes, T., Kull, C. A., et al. (2010). From hope to crisis and back again? A critical history of the global CBNRM narrative. *Environmental Conservation*, 37(01), 5-15.
- Edyegu, D., Watala, P., 2010. Museveni directs on Busoga, Elgon reserves. *New Vision* (24 October 2010). URL=<http://allafrica.com/stories/201010250296.html> (accessed 11 June 2012).
- Eltringham, S.K., 1994. Can wildlife pay its way? *Oryx* 28 (3), 163-168.
- Eltringham, S.K., Malpas, R.C., 1993. The conservation status of Uganda’s game and forest reserves in 1982 and 1983. *African Journal of Ecology* 31, 91-105.
- Etengu, N., 2003. K’jong kill 1600 Sabiny – report. *New Vision* (28.04.2003). URL= <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/16/130611> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Etengu, N., 2005. Rangers block peasants from park. *New Vision* (17.05.2005). URL= <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/17/435092> (accessed 20.06.2014).

- Faris, S., 2007. The other side of carbon trading. *Fortune* (30.08.2007). URL=[http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/27/news/international/uganda\\_carbon\\_trading.fortune/](http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/27/news/international/uganda_carbon_trading.fortune/) (accessed 22.06.2014).
- Ferraro, P.J., Hanauer, M.M., Sims, K.R.E., 2011. Conditions associated with protected area success in conservation and poverty reduction. *PNAS* 108 (34), 13913-13918.
- FACE Foundation. 1992. *General Conditions of Contract for CO2 Offset*. FACE Foundation, Rotterdam, Netherlands.
- Francis, P., James, R., 2003. Balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation: The contradictions of Uganda's decentralization program. *World Development* 31 (2), 325-337.
- Goldschmidt, W. 1967. *Sebei Law*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- Government of Uganda, 2000. *Chapter 200: The Uganda Wildlife Act*. Government of Uganda, Kampala. Available at: [http://www.mtti.go.ug/index.php/downloads/doc\\_download/190-uganda-wildlife-act-cap.html](http://www.mtti.go.ug/index.php/downloads/doc_download/190-uganda-wildlife-act-cap.html) (Accessed 22 April 2012).
- Grossman, G., Lewis, J.I., 2014. Administrative unit proliferation. *American Political Science Review*, doi:10.1017/S0003055413000567.
- Harvey, D., 1996. *Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference*. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
- Heald, S., 1986. "Mafias in Africa: The Rise of Drinking Companies and Vigilante Groups in Bugisu District, Uganda." *Africa* 56(4): 446-467.
- Heald, S., 1998. *Controlling Anger: The Sociology of Gisu Violence*. Second Edition. Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press.
- Heald, S., 1999. *Manhood and Morality: Sex, Violence, and Ritual in Gisu Society*. London: Routledge.
- Himmelfarb, D., 2006. *Moving people, moving boundaries: The socio-economic effects of protectionist conservation, involuntary resettlement, and tenure insecurity on the edge of Mt. Elgon National Park, Uganda*. Agroforestry in Landscape Mosaics Working Paper Series. World Agroforestry Centre, Tropical Resources Institute of Yale University, and the University of Georgia.
- Himmelfarb, D. 2012. *In the Aftermath of Displacement: A Political Ecology of Dispossession, Transformation, and Conflict on Mount Elgon, Uganda*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Athens: Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia.
- Hinchley, D., 1998. Review of Collaborative Resource Management Agreements for Mt. Elgon National Park. Technical Report No. 21. IUCN, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Hulme, D., Murphree, M. 2001. Community conservation in Africa: An introduction. In *African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation*, eds D. Hulme and M. Murphree, 1-8. James Currey, Oxford.
- Human Rights Network (Hurinet) Uganda, 2011. *Resource Based Conflicts and Human Rights Violations in Uganda: A Case Study of Selected Protected Areas*. Hurinet-Uganda/Diakonia-Sweden, Kampala, Uganda.
- Human Rights Watch, 2008. *"All the men have gone": War crimes in Kenya's Mount Elgon Conflict*. Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C.
- Human Rights Watch, 2011. *"Hold your Heart": Waiting for Justice in Kenya's Mount Elgon Region*. Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C.

- International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), 2014. Indigenous peoples in Uganda. URL= <http://www.iwgia.org/regions/africa/uganda> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Jaramogi, P., 2008. Kapchorwa local leaders in arms over park evictions. *New Vision* (27.02.2008). URL= <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/579/613730> (accessed 21.06.2014).
- Katto, F., 2004. *Sustainable livelihoods and environmental income dependence around Mt. Elgon National Park, Uganda*. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. Ås, Norway: Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
- Lang, C., 2005. Uganda: Face Foundation, carbon conflict, and FSC certification *WRM Bulletin* 101. URL= <http://chrislang.org/2005/12/24/uganda-face-foundation-carbon-conflict-and-fsc-certification/> (accessed 22.06.2014).
- Lang, C., 2008. Uganda: Thousands of indigenous people evicted from FSC-certified Mount Elgon National Park. *WRM Bulletin* 131. URL= <http://chrislang.org/2008/06/27/uganda-thousands-of-indigenous-people-evicted-from-fsc-certified-mount-elgon-national-park/> (accessed 22.06.2014).
- Lang, C., Byakola, T., 2006. *A Funny Place to Store Carbon: UWA-FACE Foundation's Tree Planting Project in Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda*. World Rainforest Movement, Frankfurt, Germany. Available at: [http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Uganda/Place\\_Store\\_Carbon.pdf](http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Uganda/Place_Store_Carbon.pdf) Retrieved 10 April 2012.
- Larsen, S.L., Kamugasha, B.N., Karani, I., 2008. Mid-Term Review of Mount Elgon Regional Ecosystem Conservation Programme (MERECP). Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Lemos, M. C., Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 31, 297-325.
- MacKenzie, C.A., 2012. Accruing benefit or loss from a protected area: Location matters. *Ecological Economics* 76, 119-129.
- Mafabi, D., 2010. Bududa landslide victims oppose relocation to Kiryandongo district. *Daily Monitor* (23.08.2010). URL= <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/994950/-/x4ho40/-/index.html> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Mafabi, D., 2013. Elgon encroachers use sorcery to scare rangers. *Daily Monitor* (28.07.2014). URL= <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Elgon-encroachers-use-sorcery-to-scare-rangers/-/688334/1928620/-/kj4iod/-/index.html> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Mamdani, M., 1976. *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. Heinemann, London.
- Mkutu, K.A., 2008. Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. James Currey, Oxford, UK.
- Moll, R., 2011. *The Privilege to Cooperate: Assessing the Impact of Collaborative Resource Management Agreements on Local Communities' Livelihoods around Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda*. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
- Mosse, D., 2005. *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. Pluto Press, London.
- Moura-Costa, P.H., Stuart, M.D. 1998. Forestry-based greenhouse gas mitigation: a short story of market evolution. *Commonwealth Forestry Review* 77: 191-202.
- Mwayafu, D., Kimbowa, R., 2011. *Issues and options for benefit sharing in REDD+ in East Africa: A case study of Mount Elgon Regional Conservation Programme*. REDDnet/Overseas Development Institute, London.

- National Forestry Authority (NFA), 2011. *Assessment of Trends of Evictions From Protected Areas during the Period 2005-2010 and their Implications for REDD+*. Kampala: NFA.
- Neumann, R. P. 1995. Ways of seeing Africa: colonial recasting of African society and landscape in Serengeti National Park. *Cultural Geographies*, 2(2), 149-169.
- Neumann, R.P., 1998. *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- New Vision, 2001. Displaced die. *New Vision* (17.09.2001). URL=<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/17/21693> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Ngatya, K., 2001. Mt. Elgon evictions cause public outcry. *New Vision* (12.02.2001). URL=<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/26/8334> (accessed 20.06.2014).
- Norgrove, L., 2002. *Parking Resistance and Resisting the Park: The Theory and Practice of National Park Management, A Case Study of Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.
- Norgrove, L., Hulme, D., 2006. Confronting conservation at Mount Elgon, Uganda. *Development and Change* 37 (5), 1093-1116.
- Okwaare, S., Hargreaves, S., 2009. *Mountains of Trouble: The Benet Community of Uganda*. ActionAid Critical Stories of Change Series. ActionAid, Kampala.
- Paterson, M., Stripple, J., 2012. Virtuous carbon. *Environmental Politics* 21(4): 563-582.
- Sandbrook, C. 2010. Putting leakage in its place: The significance of retained tourism revenue in the local context in rural Uganda. *Journal of International Development* 22 (1), 124-136.
- Sandbrook, C., Adams, W.M., 2012. Accessing the impenetrable: The nature and distribution of tourism benefits at a Ugandan national park. *Society and Natural Resources* 25(9), 915-932.
- Scott, P., 1998. *From Conflict to Collaboration: People and Forests at Mount Elgon, Uganda*. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK.
- SGS Agrocontrol, 2001. *Uganda Wildlife Authority-Face Foundation Natural High Forest Rehabilitation Project, Mt. Elgon National Park, Uganda: GHG Project Validation and Verification Main Assessment Report*. SGS Agrocontrol, Spijkensisse, Netherlands.
- SGS Qualifor, 2009. *UWA-FACE Mount Elgon National Park Forest Management Certification Report: Public Summary*. SGS Qualifor, Booyens, South Africa.
- Sikor, T. (ed). 2013. *The Justices and Injustices of Ecosystem Services*. Earthscan, London.
- Smith, N., 1992. Contours of a spatialized politics: Homeless vehicles and the production of geographical scale. *Social Text* 33, 54-81.
- Sletten, M., Vedeld, P., Kaboggoza, J., 2008. To co-operate or not to co-operate? A study of collaborative management planning in Mount Elgon National Park, Uganda. Noragric Working Paper No. 46. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway.
- Sullivan, S. 2011. Conservation is sexy! What makes this so, and what does this make? An engagement with *Celebrity and the Environment*. *Conservation and Society* 9 (4), 334-345.
- Sunseri, T., 2005. 'Something else to burn': forest squatters, conservationists, and the state in modern Tanzania. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43 (4), 609-640.

- Tumushabe, G.W., 2005. The Theoretical and Legal Foundations of Community-Based Property Rights in East Africa. ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 12. Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), Kampala, Uganda.
- Tumusiime, D., Vedeld, P., 2012. False promise or false promise? Using tourism revenue sharing to promote conservation and poverty reduction in Uganda. *Conservation and Society* 10 (1), 15-28.
- Turner, W. R., Brandon, K., Brooks, T.M., Gascon, C., Gibbs, H.K., Lawrence, K.S., et al., 2012. Global biodiversity conservation and the alleviation of poverty. *BioScience* 62 (1), 85-92.
- Turnbull, C., 1972. *The Mountain People*. Simon & Schuster, New York.
- Turyahabwe, N., Banana, A. Y., 2008. An overview of history and development of forest policy and legislation in Uganda. *International Forestry Review*, 10(4), 641-656.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS), 2002. *2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Population Size and Distribution. Analytical Report*. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala, Uganda.
- Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), 2010. *Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF): UCC Support through the RCDF Programme*. Uganda Communications Commission, Kampala, Uganda.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2000. *Revenue sharing policy and guidelines*. UWA, Kampala.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2009a. *Mount Elgon National Park General Management Plan, 2009-2019*. UWA, Kampala.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). 2009b. *Memorandum of Understanding Between Uganda Wildlife Authority and Bududa District Local Government For and On Behalf of the Relevant Communities of Bududa District for Collaborative Park Restoration*. UWA, Mbale, Uganda.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2010a. Budget for the Financial Year 2010/2011. UWA, Kampala, Uganda.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2010b. UWA-FACE Progressive Forest Restoration Report, Jan 1994 – Oct 2010. UWA, Kampala, Uganda.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2011a. Conservation Fees, July 2011 – June 2013. UWA, Kampala, Uganda.
- Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 2011b. *Guidelines for Revenue Sharing Between Wildlife Protected Areas and Adjacent Local Governments and Communities*. UWA, Kampala, Uganda.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 1991. Project Grant Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the United States of America for the Action Program for the Environment. USAID, Washington, D.C.
- USAID, 2003. *USAID's Enduring legacy in natural forests: Livelihoods, landscapes and Governance, Volume 3*. USAID, Washington, D.C.
- Vangen, C., 2009. *Evicted in the Name of Nature: The Process of Eviction and its Impact on Local Rural Livelihoods in Mount Elgon, Uganda*. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway.
- Vedeld, P., Jumane, A., Wapalila, G., Songorwa, A., 2012. Protected areas, poverty, and conflicts: A livelihood case study of Mikumi National Park, Tanzania. *Forest Policy and Economics* 21, 20-31.

- Wambi, M., 2009. Uganda: Carbon trading scheme pushing people off their land. *IPS News* (25.09.2009). URL= <http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/09/uganda-carbon-trading-scheme-pushing-people-off-their-land/> (accessed 22.06.2014).
- Webster, G., 1954. *Working Plan for Mount Elgon Forest Reserve*. Government printer, Entebbe, Uganda.
- Webster, G., Osmaston, H., 2003. *A History of the Uganda Forest Department, 1951-1965*. Commonwealth Secretariat, London.
- White, S., 2002. *People-Park Conflicts in Mt. Elgon: The Role of Collaborative Management in Conflict Resolution*. Paper presented to the National Conference on Mountains and Highlands in Uganda, 3<sup>rd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> October 2002, Makerere University, Kampala.
- Woods, K., 2011. Ceasefire capitalism: military-private partnerships, resource concessions, and military-state building in the Burma-China borderlands. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38 (4), 747-770.
- World Bank/Global Environment Facility (GEF), 2002. *Project Appraisal Document – Protected Areas Management and Sustainable Use*. World Bank/GEF, Washington, D.C.